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HANDBOOK

Effects-Based Operations
Brigade to Company Level

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
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FOREWORD

This handbook examines effects-based operations from brigade to company level. The concept was developed and refined by observer controllers (O/Cs) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). It is based on several reconnaissance missions to Iraq and Afghanistan, a review of numerous lessons learned articles and comments on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and observations from four OIF mission rehearsal exercises conducted at the JRTC. Extensive input was received from U.S. Army units currently participating in actual combat operations and stability operations and support operations. This handbook is a tactical translation of the tenets set forth in **FM 3.0,** *Operations,* and in joint publications.

In today's complex security environment, commanders can no longer plan military operations against an enemy force without closely scrutinizing follow-on effects that will impact on the objectives enunciated in the campaign plan. Effects-based planning must be embedded into everything commanders and staff do.

LAWRENCE H. SAUL
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Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
BRIGADE TO COMPANY LEVEL

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Introduction

by COL Samuel H. Johnson

"Today, our Nation is at war and we are a critical part of the joint team — an Army at war. This is not a new war. Our enemies have been waging it for some time, and it will continue for the foreseeable future. As the President has stated, "This is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy." It is a war we must win, a war for our very way of life. War is both a physical reality and a state of mind. War is ambiguous, uncertain, and unfair. When we are at war, we must think and act differently. We become more flexible and more adaptable."

Arrival Message, General Peter J. Schoomaker, 35th Chief of Staff of the Army

We are a nation in a global war on terrorism. The war on terrorism creates missions for Army units that range from full-scale combat operations to support operations and stability operations (SOSO). This war is a joint fight, drawing on all elements of U.S. national power, including our sister services and all agencies of the U.S. Government. It is also a combined fight involving coalition partners around the globe as well as international government organizations (IGO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and private volunteer organizations (PVO). The fight is against traditional combat forces and terrorist organizations while we and our partners support or establish host nation governments.

Clearly the environment has changed military operations, and political efforts are no longer right hand and left hand to national objectives; they are partnered in a closed fist of a global effort against terrorism. As a result, our operational planning and execution must change as well. Synchronizing operations in this new environment proscribes thinking, planning, or operating as we did in the "cold war" era with a stovepiped mindset. Synchronizing operations in the new environment means we must focus on desired effects and apply all elements of applicable combat power to achieve those effects.

This document outlines effects-based operations from brigade to company level. This concept has been developed by observer controllers at the JRTC after several reconnaissance missions to Iraq and Afghanistan, a review of numerous lessons learned articles and comments on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and observations from four OIF mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) conducted at the JRTC. The authors of this document do not claim to have all of the answers, but feel obligated to share this concept with the force to stimulate thinking,

create debate, and serve as a launching platform for doctrinal and organizational changes.

Chapter 1: Defining Effects-Based Operations

by LTC Kevin W. Milton and CPT Phillip G. Jenison

"As we seek to resolve the issues associated with transforming our Army for the current and future security environment, we must not allow solutions to be constrained by processes, policies, and systems designed for a world system that no longer exists."

United States Army: The Way Ahead

The events of September 11, 2001 challenged Army leaders in ways unimagined before that fateful date, opening the United States' global war on terrorism (GWOT). In meeting those challenges, the Army's leadership has recognized the need to think and act differently than in the past. Moreover, those changes affect every leader — from squad leader to corps commander. Each must quickly adapt to this new environment to remain relevant and effective. Military operations from corps to squad must flow seamlessly from national strategy objectives: what the squad leader is attempting to achieve must support what the national command authorities have decided must be done. Central to that is the Army's transformation to an effects-based organization in an extremely complex operational environment. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) must adopt effects-based operations (EBO) to support Army and national campaign plans.

Effects-Based Operations

The term effects-based operations has been used by various units across the Army, but has no doctrinal definition. The observer controller (OC) team of the JRTC Fire Support Division offers the following definition to establish a point of reference:

> *Effects-Based Operations (EBO): Offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations planned and executed to achieve the commander's desired effect on a threat element, civil leader (tribal, ethnic, or governmental), or population group. EBO achieves the commander's desired effect through the synchronized, sequential, or simultaneous application of leadership, maneuver, firepower, and information.*

A careful review of current doctrine reveals that the Army has always been focused on effects. **FM 3-0,** *Operations,* states: "The elements of combat power are building blocks that underlie the generation of combat power. In land operations, commanders combine and apply the elements of combat power to produce overwhelming effects." These elements of combat power

are defined as maneuver, firepower, protection, information, and leadership. Looking deeper into doctrine, **FM 3-90,** *Tactics,* states: "A mission statement contains the *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *why* associated with a specific operation. The *what* and *why* of a mission statement are not the same thing and both are needed. The *what* is an effect that is normally measurable. The *why* of a mission statement provides the mission's purpose or reason." From these two examples alone it is easy to argue that the Army has been an effects-based organization for some time. To further make the point, examine Figure 1-1 below (Tactical Mission Tasks) from FM 3-90. You will notice the tactical tasks commonly used, such as *defeat*, *destroy*, and *penetrate*, all describe the effect desired on an enemy force. Army doctrine remains valid and should continue to be used to operate in the new environment.

ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCE		EFFECTS ON ENEMY FORCE
Assault*	Follow and Asssume	Block
Attack-by-Fire	Follow and Support	Canalize
Breach	Linkup*	Contain
Bypass	Occupy	Defeat
Clear	Reconstitution**	Destroy
Combat Search and Rescue	Reduce	Disrupt
Consolidation & Reorganization*	Retain	Fix
Control	Secure	Interdict
Counterreconnaissance	Seize	Isolate
Disengagement	Support-by-Fire	Neutralize
Exfiltrate	Suppress	Penetrate
		Turn

TYPES AND FORMS OF OPERATIONS

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT*
   Search and Attack*
ATTACK*
   Ambush*
   Demonstration*
OPERATIONS**
   Feint*
   Raid*
   Spoiling Attack*
EXPLOITATION*
PURSUIT*
FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER*
   Envelopment*
   Frontal Attack*
   Infiltration*
   Penetration*
   Turning Movement*
AREA DEFENSE*
MOBILE DEFENSE**

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS*
   Delay*
   Withdrawal*
   Retirement
RECONNAISSANCE
SECURITY OPERATIONS*
INFORMATION OPERATIONS**
COMBINED ARMS BREACH
PASSAGE OF LINES*
RELIEF IN PLACE*
RIVER CROSSING
TROOP MOVEMENT*
   Administrative Movement*
   Approach March*
   Road March*

*Defined in FM 3-90
**Defined in other manuals

Figure 1-1

In the past, Army operational and tactical leaders largely focused on the effects desired against an enemy formation. Only at the strategic level did Army leaders go beyond such force-based operations. The classic effects-based mission of World War II was that given to General Eisenhower for Operation Overlord:

> *You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces.*

Despite the last phrase, Eisenhower's mission was not totally focused on Germany's armed forces. As Commander, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Eisenhower had to consider all factors that affected his mission. As a coalition leader, Eisenhower's greatest challenge was harnessing the energies of subordinate coalition leaders actively pursuing agendas not in agreement with his overarching mission. Eisenhower's mission also implied objectives tied to the German national will to fight; full destruction of her armed forces was seen as a critical element. Eisenhower had to invade Europe; hold together a coalition of forces as they crossed conquered territories; pierce the central physical, emotional, and economic heart of the Fatherland; and totally destroy Germany's military forces. There was to be no repeat of World War I after World War II.

In today's environment, the challenges facing Eisenhower as a strategic leader extend down to the tactical level. Army leaders at all levels must expand their field of view to focus on all the actors who can affect operations. In current operational fights, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Joint Guardian (KFOR), and Operation Joint Force (SFOR), Army leaders are focused on the effects desired on the following:

- Enemy forces, insurgent forces, non-compliant forces
- Civil population
- Local leaders

Tactical leaders face similar challenges. The increased involvement and concern with the civil population and local leaders adds complexity to the battlefield and complicates planning. Commanders can no longer plan military operations against an enemy force and not consider the second and third order effects such military actions will have on the civil population and/or local leaders with whom they seek favorable relations. This complexity is exactly the reason Army leaders must now become effects-based in everything they do.

To truly become effects-based, leaders must understand how military operations support the national, regional combatant commander, and the joint task force commander's campaign plans. Campaign plans describe the effects or conditions necessary to achieve mission success and exit strategy (**JP 5-00.1,** *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*). A suggested technique is to include the campaign plan goals and/or objectives within the unit's mission statement and in the key tasks and end state of the commander's intent. By doing this, leaders ensure subordinates use these nested effects as the basis for initiative (see examples in Figures 1-2 and 1-3).

EXAMPLE MISSION STATEMENT

NLT 190800 June 03, 3rd Brigade Combat Team occupies AO BEAR and conducts offensive operations to defeat anti-coalition elements and simultaneously conducts stability operations and support operations to improve infrastructure and promote a self-governed society able to sustain and defend itself.

Figure 1-2

EXAMPLE COMMANDER'S INTENT

Key Tasks:

Protect the force.

Prevent FRE and terrorist forces from disrupting activities at Tier I-III sites.

Neutralize destabilizing forces' ability to execute coordinated attacks and neutralize resistance to US/coalition, CPA, and IGC operations.

Promote ICDC/Iraqi Police Force/FPS as viable, credible organizations. Joint ops are the norm, not the exception.

Mitigate competitors' propaganda efforts by attacking district <u>needs</u>, not wants, first.

End state:

Friendy: US/coalition fixed sites secured from direct and indirect attacks. Iraqi government prepared to assume responsibility for self-governance, and our forces are fully prepared to transition control to a fully established Iraqi system.

Enemy: Threat elements defeated and resistance to US/coalition forces neutralized.

Terrain: Infrastructure restored to above pre-war levels. Freedom of movement throughout the brigade AOR assured along MSRs by the removal of IEDs.

Figure 1-3

Also key is a clear understanding of the decisive operation. FM 3-0 describes decisive operations as, "Those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements." Defining the decisive operation in today's complex environment requires commanders to describe the effect desired against an actor (enemy, local leader, or civil population). To define the decisive operation, commanders must determine the actor (or group of actors) representing the greatest threat to fulfilling the campaign plan. The commander must describe that decisive

operation as a "what" (desired effect), not a "who" (identifying the unit to accomplish the decisive operation). For example, a commander could say, "The decisive operation is the identification and neutralization of insurgent command and control (C2) cells."

Another new dynamic in the current environment is continuous, simultaneous operations. In the past, the Army's combat training centers (CTCs) and the battle command training program (BCTP) have not prepared units for continuous operations that occur at the same time, often separated geographically. The force is conditioned to fight one fight after another versus continuous operations simultaneously in a new complex environment. This trend will quickly correct itself due to the large number of leaders who have been involved in OIF, OEF, KFOR, and SFOR over the past several years as well as a change of focus for training centers.

Information Superiority – Seizing The Ground Truth

Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same (**FM 3-0,** ***Operations***). Furthermore, **FM 3-06,** ***Urban Operations,*** states: "The information environment is the sum of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, and disseminate information." Therefore, since intelligence drives maneuver, establishing information superiority is key to the collection of intelligence. To gain the operational advantage, commanders must identify the positive and negative activities occurring within their area of responsibility (AOR). Doing so allows them to capitalize on the positive and quickly counter the negative before the latter becomes catastrophic. If commanders are to control an adversary or populace, leaders must train the force to collect, analyze, and disseminate information. Commanders direct three interdependent contributors to achieve this goal:

- Information management
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Information operations (including related activities)

(**FM 3-13,** ***Information Operations***)

Information superiority is a doctrinal concept that has been with the Army for some time. It has grown in significance in today's environment. And although the doctrinal definition works well in a traditional force-on-force fight, it must be modified slightly to fit stability operations and support operations (SOSO). If the word "adversary" is replaced with "actor," leaders can apply this definition to the current environment.

To gain information superiority, commanders rely on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); information management (IM); and information operations (IO). The synchronization of these activities allows commanders the ability to see first, understand first, and finish decisively. In traditional operations, leaders are able to gain information superiority through the use of national, corps, and division assets, as well as select brigade-controlled assets such as the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) and other sensors. In SOSO, organizations are as much bottom fed as they are top fed. This is a significant change from conventional operations and must be mastered to truly gain information superiority.

Bottom-fed information comes in many forms. Civil affairs (CA) assessments, psychological operations (PSYOP) assessments, battalion task force (TF) commander assessments, bilateral negotiation records, and patrol debriefs are but a few. Each in isolation will not assist the commander or his staff to focus the efforts of the BCT. Taken together and analyzed by the staff, however, they paint a picture for the commander. But doing so means the BCT staff must have systems in place to collect this information, update staff estimates, and present this information to the commander in the form of a mission analysis brief. Once the commander is able to visualize his battlespace, he can then issue planning guidance and make decisions based on relevant information.

One of the most overlooked means for developing information is the patrol debrief. In SOSO, every soldier is a collector. Systems must be put in place to capitalize on the information soldiers collect during the execution of every mission. Soldier interaction with local leaders and the population will provide valuable information to commanders, allowing better and faster decisions. One of the best tools to collect this vital information is a simple debrief. Every patrol, convoy, and guard shift should debrief. The debrief format used across the BCT should be standardized and include a portion allowing leaders to address specific information requirements (SIR) or specific orders and/or requests (SOR) associated with each mission. Patrols are debriefed at company level; the raw data is fed to the battalion TF staff for analysis and then reported to the brigade staff. If brigade directed the SIR or SOR, the answers are forwarded to the brigade staff for immediate action/analysis.

Once BCTs understand the paradigm shift of becoming a bottom-fed organization and emplace functional systems to collect such information, they can become an effects-based organization. These systems enable information superiority. They are critical in allowing the commander to visualize, describe, and direct actions within the brigade AOR.

Spheres of Influence

Defining the AOR's spheres of influence (SOI) will greatly assist commanders in establishing and maintaining information superiority and achieve the commander's desired effects on the battlefield. An SOI is a non-doctrinal information term specifying a fixed transmitter/receiver relationship between a leader and a target audience's key communicator. Barring exceptional circumstances, the designated leader conducts all interaction with a designated key local leader.

SOI have been used successfully for years in Operation Joint Guardian (KFOR) and Operation Joint Force (SFOR). Task Force Falcon established the SOI concept to reduce information fratricide. Information fratricide results from employing information operations elements in a way that adversely affects friendly operations or forces the information environment (**FM 3-13,** *Information Operations*). SOI serve very much like company maneuver graphics – they define ownership and responsibility. When various persons or organizations, each with their own agenda, ignore SOI and deal independently with a local leader, problems are sure to arise. If this happens, the commander responsible for that SOI will likely be ignored or, worse, steamrolled by this local leader.

The SOI development process begins at brigade during the military decision-making process (MDMP). The staff conducts information intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to produce a combined information overlay (CIO) (Figure 1-4). The piece of this overlay that contributes to SOI development is the identification of key local leaders with their associated sphere of influence/control. With this information, the brigade staff can identify key leaders that brigade-level leaders should meet with routinely. Additionally, the brigade staff sets the level of leadership for each key leader in the battalion TF AOR for battalion commanders. If this is not done at brigade, each subordinate TF will assign SOI contacts to the best of their ability, likely creating differing levels of leadership across the brigade AOR. Information spreads quickly among population groups, and local leaders in one village will feel less important to coalition or U.S. forces when they find out that local leaders from a neighboring village are meeting with a higher lever of leadership. This same concept works in reverse with equally disastrous results: If a TF commander assigns company commanders as the primary SOI contact for every key leader in a village, he is by default giving the mayor the same level of prestige as the tribal sheik – a huge mistake.

SOI development is a crucial part of the relief-in-place (RIP)/ transfer-of-authority (TOA) process. The incoming unit should use the existing SOI as one part of their analysis; this is the time to make changes in SOI levels of responsibility if necessary. During the right seat ride (RSR)/left seat ride

Combined Information Overlay
(Portrays information environment effects military operations)

Significant characteristics of the Info Environment:

Physical Domain
- Terrain
- Populace
- Civil (info) infrastructure

Information Domain
- Info distribution and flow
- Leadership (religious, civil, tribal)
- Info quality (content)

Cognitive Domain
- Perceptions and awareness

Combined information overlay →

Figure 1-4

(LSR) process, the incoming unit must carefully adhere to their SOI. Often this is the first opportunity for information fratricide; senior leaders in the brigade and/or TF are the usual culprits. When executed correctly, the habitual relationship between task force leaders and the local leadership is established as a part of the TOA process.

SOI may change on occasion, but such changes should be minimized. Once established, the goal is to maintain this relationship for as long as possible to build interactive personal and professional relationships. Like any other relationship, the longer one commits, the greater the chances of positive feedback from the other party.

At brigade and battalion TF level, a simple tool should be used to track SOI (see Figure 1-5). The brigade effects team consolidates the data and distributes it across the BCT as one component of the common operational picture (COP). With this tool any leader in the BCT who needs information from a local leader can pinpoint his primary point of contact (POC) to begin coordination. Without this tool, a BCT leader trying to do the right thing is likely to commit information fratricide. The tracking tool identifies each local leader by name and position, identifies the level of leadership to serve as the primary POC for this leader, identifies the level of leadership to oversee this leader's actions, and identifies the frequency for routine meetings. As an example, if a company commander has direct responsibility for the town leader, he then becomes the primary leader for military matters and formal negotiations. The battalion commander

oversees these actions based off his experience and only engages the leader when required in a crisis.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE SPREADSHEET							
A/TF 1							
KEY LEADERS IN J-Town	FETI SHARIFI	TOWN ADMINISTRATOR	PL/IO	DIRECT	CO CDR	OVERSIGHT	W
	RUZDI SELIMI	XXX LEADER	PL	DIRECT	IO	OVERSIGHT	AN
	IDRIZ UKSHINI	XXX LEADER	PL	DIRECT	IO	OVERSIGHT	AN
	NEXHAT SELIMI	PRINCIPAL	PL	DIRECT	IO	OVERSIGHT	W
		BUSINESS OWNERS	SQD LDRS	DIRECT	PL	OVERSIGHT	D
		POPULACE	SQD LDRS	DIRECT	PL	OVERSIGHT	D
KEY LEADERS IN Y-Town	SASHA DJORDJEVIC	MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY	PL	DIRECT	CO CDR	OVERSIGHT	M
	ZORAN PERIC	DOCTOR, FORMER XXX REP, CHURCH COUNCIL	PL	DIRECT	CO CDR	OVERSIGHT	D
	MILORAD DJORIC	PASJANE ENGINEER	PL	OVERSIGHT	CO CDR	SUPPORT	M
	DRAGAN NIKOLIC	XXX REP;XXX CHURCH COUNCIL	PL	DIRECT	CO CDR	OVERSIGHT	M
	TODOR PERIC		PL	OVERSIGHT	CO CDR	SUPPORT	AN
	DRAGAN PETROVIC	TOWN COUNCIL MEMBER	PL	DIRECT	CO CDR	OVERSIGHT	AN
	NENAD NICHOLIC		PL	OVERSIGHT	CO CDR	SUPPORT	AN
	DRAGAN DIMOTRIAVIZ		PL	OVERSIGHT	CO CDR	SUPPORT	AN
	SLADAN MLADENOVIC		PL	OVERSIGHT	CO CDR	SUPPORT	AN
	BRAHVO STOJVOVIC		PL	OVERSIGHT	CO CDR	SUPPORT	AN

Figure 1-5

Conclusion

Our doctrine remains valid; effects remain a central element in operations. But the environment has changed and continues to change daily. Situational awareness and situational understanding dictate that we broaden the definition of effects. Leaders at all levels must break the paradigm of thinking that military operations are force on force focused. They must expand their field of view so they see the strategic "forest" instead of only focusing on the tactical "trees." When this is done, units will become efficient effects-based organizations.

Chapter 2: Brigade Effects-Based Planning

by CW3 John P. Watson

"To defeat the enemies who threaten our freedoms, we cannot remain static, trapped in a web of our own no longer relevant policies, procedures, and processes."

United States Army: The Way Ahead

To become an effects-based organization, the brigade staff must reorganize to plan and execute operations in an increasingly complex environment. Once the staff organization is solidified, the BCT will be prepared to gather and analyze information and effectively focus the brigade's efforts to accomplish the commander's desired effects on the battlefield. Additionally, they will be better suited for the military decision-making process (MDMP), ready to plan effects-based operations using the effects planning cycle.

Part 1: Organizing the Brigade Staff

The brigade commander has many tools and assets available to achieve his desired effects on an enemy or populace (see Figure 2-1). To synchronize these tools and assets, he must organize the brigade staff for efficiency. If this is not done, the brigade staff will become a network of stovepiped entities, each moving out on a different azimuth.


Figure 2-1

Typically, observer controllers (O/Cs) at JRTC see brigade tactical operating centers (TOCs) composed of multiple, seemingly independent cells. It is not unusual to see a current operations cell, a plans cell, a separate project coordination cell (PCC), and a separate effects coordination cell (ECC) or fires and effects coordination cell (FECC). Each of these cells

are so independent that orders or instructions sent to subordinate units are not synchronized to achieve the commander's desired effect. All too often they conflict with each other.

Plans and Operations Cells

To correct this, brigade TOCs organize under two overarching cells – plans and current operations (see Figure 2-2). As overall managers and staff section supervisors, the brigade executive officer's (XO) and S3's staff duties and responsibilities remain valid. Due to the intensity of operations, it is not uncommon and entirely appropriate for the commander to direct the S3 to focus his efforts on current operations while the XO focuses on planning future operations. As shown in Figure 2-2, the S3 uses his primary assistants — the assistant S3-operations officer and the assistant S3-plans officer — to lead each cell. Instead of working independently, the newly formed cells (project coordination cell [PCC] and the effects coordination cell [ECC]) work under and become an extension of plans since the plans cell is responsible for developing future operations.


Figure 2-2

As units train to execute simultaneous combat operations and SOSO in support of OIF or OEF, brigades must establish an ECC and some type of a pre-combat checklist (PCC). These new cells help commanders focus and synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects. They direct humanitarian relief and reconstruction initiatives toward the commander's desired outcome.

Effects Coordination Cell (ECC)

The ECC is formed around the existing brigade fire support element (FSE) with the purpose of integrating and synchronizing lethal and nonlethal effects. As shown in Figure 2-2, the ECC is headed by the deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD) and is composed of an IO coordinator (IOCOORD), public affairs officer (PAO), psychological operations (PSYOP) officer, staff judge advocate (SJA), and the brigade targeting officer (TO). The direct support field artillery battalion commander serves as the brigade effects coordinator (ECOORD), if he is not committed as a maneuver commander, and the BDE fire support officer (FSO) is the DECOORD.

- *Effects Coordinator (ECOORD) and Deputy Effects Coordinator (DECOORD)*

    The ECOORD and DECOORD are responsible for the integration and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. Other key responsibilities include:
    - Acting as key advisors to the brigade commander and staff on the use and synchronization of battlefield effects.
    - Obtaining the commander's guidance for desired effects and their purpose.
    - Analyzing higher HQ's orders and presenting effects-based requirements to the BCT staff.
    - Developing essential effects tasks (EET) that drive or support maneuver operations.
    - Ensuring themes and messages are translated into appropriate talking points.
    - Ensuring measures of effectiveness (MOE) collection is focused.
    - Providing mission-specific priority intelligence requirements (PIR)/information requirements (IR) that are pre-briefed to every unit/patrol prior to mission execution.
    - Facilitating planning meetings (the effects working group and synchronization meeting) in the absence of the brigade XO.

- *Information Operations Coordinator (IOCOORD)*

    The IOCOORD is responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing information operations. If the brigade is not structured with an IOCOORD, these duties and responsibilities fall to the DECOORD. Other IOCOORD duties include:
    - Working with the ECOORD and DECOORD to advise the commander on IO effects in the context of planned lethal and

nonlethal fires and effects in support of tactical operations.
Advice focuses on the status of friendly, neutral, and
adversary IO systems' capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Ensuring IO effects are integrated into operations planning
and the resulting OPORD.
Ensuring that IO actions (performed by assigned or
augmenting IO assets) are coordinated, integrated, and
synchronized with the brigade plan/order.
Obtaining and processing relevant information and
intelligence to produce IO situational awareness (SA).
Provide IO SA information to the ECC SA common
operational picture.
Ensuring the IO element performs required staff coordination
for IO support from higher HQ.
Providing assessments of the IO situation and capabilities to
support ongoing MDMP.

- ***Public Affairs Officer (PAO)***

*"Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a
thousand bayonets."*

Napoleon Bonaparte

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that
sound and aggressive public affairs (PA) activities play a vital role in
mission accomplishment. PA influences urban operations by transmitting
information through the media to internal (urban Army forces as well as
urban civilian populace) and external audiences (**FM 3-06,** *Urban
Operations*). If a brigade is not authorized a PAO, then this position must
be established and filled in order for the brigade to have an effective IO
campaign. The PAO works for the brigade S1, but hangs his hat in the
ECC. Some of the PAO duties and responsibilities include:
Advising and informing the commander of the public affairs
impact and implications of planned or current operations.
Serving as the command representative for all
communications with external media.
Assessing the information requirements and expectations of
higher headquarters and the public, monitoring media and
public opinion, and evaluating the effectiveness of public
affairs plans and operations.
Facilitating media efforts to cover operations by expediting
the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information.
Developing and educating the command on policies and
procedures for protecting against the release of information

detrimental to the mission, national security, and personal privacy.

Coordinating with PSYOP and the S5 to ensure disseminated information is not contradictory. Synchronizing PA operations with PSYOP, civil affairs, and information operations elements to prevent "IO fratricide."

Informing soldiers, family members, and Department of Defense (DoD) civilians of their rights under the privacy act, operations security (OPSEC) responsibilities, and roles as implied representatives of the command when interacting with news media.

Assessing and recommending news, entertainment, and information needs of soldiers and home station audiences.

Working closely with the S5 and other agencies to integrate and unify efforts to communicate higher headquarters' perspective and to support the mission's tactical and operational objectives.

Advising the commander and staff on privacy act and freedom of information act matters.

Informing and countering the effects of misinformation.

Identifying points of contact with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that operate in an affected area to arrange referrals of media queries regarding their operations to an authorized spokesperson.

Developing EEFI to preclude inadvertent public disclosure.

Providing information on civil-military operations center (CMOC) activities to support PA strategy.

Synchronizing information, communications, media, and messages.

Identifying, coordinating, and integrating media, public information, and host nation support.

Conducting media assessment. Providing feedback on how operations are being reported in the host nation and international media.

(See **FM 46-1,** *PA Operations;* and **FM 3-61.1,** *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* for further discussion.)

- *Psychological Operations Officer*

Brigade combat teams are normally task organized with a 13-man tactical PSYOP detachment (TPD) commanded by a captain, with a sergeant first class as the non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). The TPD tactical staff officer not only commands the TPD, but also serves as the brigade PSYOP officer. The TPD commander/brigade PSYOP

officer provides command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) for all PSYOP forces attached or operational control (OPCON) to the brigade, and advises the commander and staff on the employment of tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs).

The brigade PSYOP officer is responsible for organizing the TPD headquarters into the brigade PSYOP cell. The TPD headquarters includes the TPD commander/brigade PSYOP officer, the detachment NCOIC, and two PSYOP specialists. The brigade PSYOP officer is responsible for the planning, integration, and monitoring of all tactical psychological operations (TACPSYOP) within the brigade AOR. The brigade PSYOP officer advises the brigade commander and staff on the psychological effects of brigade operations on the indigenous population, and serves as the commander's resident staff expert on the indigenous culture and psyche.

Doctrinally, the brigade PSYOP officer works for the brigade S3 to integrate tactical PSYOP into the ground maneuver plan (**FM 3-05.301,** ***Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***). The PSYOP officer functions as an essential member of the brigade ECC. As a member of the ECC, the PSYOP officer coordinates, synchronizes, and deconflicts PSYOP with IO. The PSYOP officer attends brigade synchronization meetings in order to nominate PSYOP-specific targets for servicing. The PSYOP officer plans, coordinates, and monitors brigade operations that focus on influencing, informing, deceiving, disrupting, delaying, degrading, or destroying the adversaries' means of C4I and IO. Other responsibilities include:

> Developing PSYOP objectives (SPOs) that support brigade information operations and higher headquarters PSYOP objectives.
> Writing the PSYOP appendix to the brigade OPORD.
> Recommending brigade-specific PSYOP plans and programs to higher headquarters.
> Coordinating with higher headquarters for print, audio, audiovisual, and aviation support for brigade PSYOP operations.
> Monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of PSYOP.
> Monitoring and assessing indigenous demographic, cultural, and political trends within the population.
> Identifying and monitoring enemy propaganda and its sources, and recommending actions to mitigate the effects of misinformation.
> Planning and synchronizing aerial loudspeaker and leaflet drop operations in support of brigade operations.

Identifying and leveraging indigenous media sources, including print, radio, and television, to support division and brigade PSYOP/IO/PA operations.

- ***Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)***

"The Judge" serves as both a personal and special staff officer (see **FM 6-0,** *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*). As a personal staff officer, the SJA's primary duty is to provide operational law advice to the commander (i.e., he keeps the commander out of jail). As a special staff officer, the SJA is responsible for providing situational understanding of the legal environment in which the brigade operates. The SJA within the ECC anticipates the legal implications of expected actions under international law and U.S. law, and the potential perception of those actions based upon the host national legal system. Understanding local legal systems will allow the SJA to forecast the likely actions of enemy forces and potentially available avenues of influencing others to either support the U.S. mission or not resist friendly activities. The SJA works in conjunction with civil affairs to restore or support judicial functions in a local government. **AR 27-1; FM 27-100,** *Legal Support to Operations;* and the *Operational Law Handbook* provide further discussion on SJA responsibilities and duties:

Provides legal advice during the MDMP regarding rules of engagement (ROE), targeting, and other legal aspects of operations.

Ensures that the brigade does not violate US Code Title 10 or Title 50.

Provides legal advice regarding international law and domestic law including the law of war, military justice, administrative law, civil law, contract and fiscal law, claims, and legal assistance.

Reviews plans, policies, directives, and ROE issued by the command to ensure their consistency with DoD Directive 5100.7 and the law of war.

Ensures the brigade's actions are consistent with DoD Directive 5100.77 and the law of war obligations of the United States.

Advises on the legality of military operations and the possible implications of treaty obligations and international agreements on it.

Forms the brigade operational law team (BOLT) with the assistance of the legal NCO.

Project Coordination Cell (PCC)

The PCC is responsible for resourcing, prioritizing, and executing civil-military operations (CMO) to achieve the commander's desired effects. Project nominations come to the PCC from subordinate TF commanders and the effects working group (EWG). The PCC then resources projects and provides the brigade commander with a staff recommendation for prioritization for approval. Once a project is resourced and approved by the commander, the PCC brings them into the synchronization meeting for inclusion in the next effects tasking order (ETO). As shown in Figure 2-2 on page 12, the PCC is led by the brigade S5 and is composed of the civil affairs team (CAT), combat hospital support officer, assistant brigade engineer (ABE), provost marshal officer (PMO), brigade S6, brigade chaplain, and the S8 (comptroller). The PCC manages projects falling under the categories listed in the table below. Level 1 (SWEAT-MS) is the basic life support requirements of the population. Level 2 (CREG) is secondary to level 1 and is focused on as time and resources become available. As with Maslov's hierarchy of needs, until the level 1 requirements are adequately established, SWEAT-MS elements are the BCT's priority.

LEVEL 1 (SWEAT-MS)	LEVEL 2 (CREG)
Sewage	**C**ommunications
Water	**R**eligion
Energy	**E**conomy
Academics	**G**overnance
Trash	
Medical	
Security	

- *Civil Affairs Officer (S5)*

As a permanent staff member, the civil affairs officer (S5) establishes and supervises the PCC. The S5 and the CAT-B team leader are the principal advisors to the commander on civil-military operations. The S5 ensures each COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC). The civil affairs officer considers not only tactical issues, but also combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) issues. Host nation support and care of displaced civilians are of particular concern. The civil affairs officer's analysis considers the impact of operations on public order and safety and protection of culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned civil affairs officer, the commander assigns these

responsibilities to another staff member (**FM 5-0,** *Army Planning and Orders Production*). The S5 considers:

> The protected target list, including cultural, religious, historical, and high-density civilian population areas.
> Nongovernmental and other independent organizations operating in the area of operations.
> Geography, to include physical features, climate, and political geography.
> History.
> People, including demographics, religions, languages, and culture and social structure.
> Host nation support.
> In cooperation with the SJA, legal and administrative systems of the host nation.

- *Civil Affairs Team-B (CAT-B) Team Leader*

In current operations most BCTs are task organized with a civil affairs team (CAT). As with the PSYOP team, these teams have proven to be an invaluable combat multiplier. The CAT's operational focus is on the civil center of gravity and on establishing, maintaining, influencing, and supporting the commander's interaction with government organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations. Civil affairs activities include population and resources control, foreign nation support, humanitarian assistance, military-civil actions, civil defense, civil assistance, and civil administration during stability operations and support operations.

The CA officer brings civilian considerations to the forefront during the targeting process to create the desired effects on the host nation population. These actions help ensure that civilians have minimal impact on tactical operations. The CAT-B team leader is responsible for:

> Integrating CA objectives/high-payoff targets with the targeting process.
> Writing the CA annex or appendix to the OPORD.
> Conducting liaison with key civilian organizations in the area of operations (AO).
> Synchronizing the civilian relief effort with objectives.
> Providing a direct linkage with the civil-military operations center (CMOC).
> Providing maneuver commanders regional/cultural expertise through reach-back.
> In urban operations (UO), minimizing civilian interference with UO and the impact of urban operations on the populace and infrastructure. CA personnel can help establish and run a

civil-military operations center to coordinate UO with civilian agencies (both governmental and nongovernmental), other services, and multinational partners.

Providing advice and assistance to restore or rehabilitate portions of the infrastructure, particularly life-sustaining portions of the administration and human services component.

Planning, supervising, and executing necessary population and resources control measures (in close coordination with military police units) until no longer required or the urban operation is completed.

When requested or when military necessity or legitimate directives require, establishing all or portions of the civil administration.

Determining available supplies and services in the urban area and, if necessary, assisting in negotiating their acquisition.

Helping commanders assess the capability, dependability, and willingness of urban sources to provide and sustain identified needs, as well as calculating the impact of using them on other aspects of the urban environment.

In conjunction with the SJA, fulfilling the Army's responsibilities toward the urban population under international, host nation, and U.S. law.

Planning and conducting the transition of control for the urban area or operation to another military or civilian governmental or nongovernmental organization or agency.

Training the force on cultural awareness, interaction techniques with the local populace, and tactical and technical procedures of executing civil affairs.

- *Engineer Coordinator and Assistant Brigade Engineer*

The engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the commander of the engineer unit that supports the BCT. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) is a permanent staff member who, in the absence of the ENCOORD, acts as an LNO to the brigade commander and staff. In an environment where units are conducting combat operations and SOSO simultaneously, the ABE's role in the PCC is to contract or coordinate/task out military troop projects within approved CMO initiatives and track the progress of ongoing projects. The ABE's other vital role is to assess supply routes and nominate targets based on enemy activity on supply routes. Additionally, the ABE provides terrain data and geospatial information to aid in the analysis of enemy operations. The ABE utilizes reach-back capability to the National Mapping Agency and the Corps of Engineers to coordinate for products and professional expertise.

- *Provost Marshal Officer (PMO)*

    The PMO's role in the PCC is to provide, in coordination with the CAT, assessments to the command on civil defense and local police. Based on the assessments and the ground tactical plan, the PMO develops recommendations to improve civil defense and local police. The PMO advises the command on the proper handling of both combatant and noncombatant detainees. In conjunction with civil affairs, the PMO establishes liaison with the local police to assess the local law enforcement system's ability to deal with types and categories of noncombatant detainees for eventual prosecution. Additionally, the PMO provides route assessments to the ABE.

- *Medical Support Officer*

    The medical support officer provides the PCC with an assessment and project recommendations on civilian medical facilities and general populace health within the brigade AOR. The medical support officer:

    Advises the staff on the host nation (HN) medical budget.
    Keeps the staff informed of all medical civic action program (MEDCAP) operations in the brigade.
    Nominates potential MEDCAP operations to the staff.
    Ensures that brigade-nominated MEDCAP operations are resourced appropriately.
    Develops assessment criteria (AAR) for MEDCAP operations.
    Ensures that all staff members receive a copy of the assessment.
    Ensures compliance with all medical rules of eligibility (MEDROE).

- *Comptroller/Resource Manager*

    The comptroller or resource manager (RM) is a position that must be filled to accurately account for funds used for CMO. The RM tracks the amount and sources of funding available to the brigade. The RM briefs available funding amounts and limitations as well as amounts already obligated to specific projects or operations. The duties of the RM include:

    Assisting the staff on budget methods and formats; techniques of preparation, resource synchronization, presentation, and analysis; and developing workload information, expense (cost) factors, cost capturing, and statistics.
    Providing fund ceilings to subordinate units.
    Monitoring execution of funded programs.

Coordinating required program budget activity meetings.
Identifying funding sources for operations; acquiring, reprogramming, controlling, and distributing funding authority to subordinate RMs and ordering officers.
Overseeing cost capturing to support requests for funding authority for operations and requests to replace funds shifted from other programs to support an operation.
Helping contract host nation support in logistics-based development, as part of the contracting implementation team.
Developing policies, procedures, and techniques to ensure the most cost advantageous and effective methods of purchasing commercial products and services within fiscal and regulatory constraints.
Monitoring administrative controls for accounting and reporting receipt and disbursement of public funds, including special contingency funds.
Developing and maintaining effective financial and management controls, procedures, and systems for the best use of resources.
Implementing resource control procedures and serving as the primary fund-certifying officer.
Supervising the implementation of RM policies.
Performing real-time audits of command systems, procedures, and internal controls to ensure their proper implementation and effective operation.
Developing and implementing an internal review program to safeguard, account for, properly use, and care for resources used in accomplishing the command's mission.

Effects Working Group

The effects working group (EWG) ensures the brigade remains focused on the development of future operations in a time-constrained environment without tying down the primary staff in planning sessions. Empowered by the primary staff section leader, with continual guidance, the EWG is comprised of the primary assistants. It is headed by the assistant S3-plans officer and includes the assistant S2-plans officer, the targeting officer (TO), CA, PSYOP, SJA, PAO representatives, and others as required (see Figure 2-3). The EWG forms to conduct analysis and begin the MDMP for future operations.

The EWG continuously updates staff estimates, conducts mission analysis, and develops courses of action (COA) for future operations. During the course of their work, the EWG also develops trend, impact, and threat assessments. Just as in the traditional MDMP, the EWG presents their

mission analysis and COA recommendation to the commander, including recommended changes to the decisive and shaping operation as well as proposed changes to the main effort and task organization. With this information, the commander issues planning guidance for the next effects tasking order (ETO).

The Effects Working Group

AS3-Plans			
AS2-Plans	Targeting Officer	CA	PSYOP
SJA Rep	S5 Rep PCC	PAO	Others as required

Figure 2-3

Effects Tasking Order

The ETO is how a BCT issues orders to subordinate commanders. The ETO follows the normal five-paragraph order format. When a brigade enters continuous operations, the ETO becomes the fragmentary order (FRAGO) that synchronizes the brigade's combat power in time and space to achieve short- and/or long-term effects. It does not replace the numerous day-to-day FRAGOs that a BCT may receive or issue; it is designed to capitalize the positive events and eliminate or mitigate identified problem areas through the synchronized use of combat, stability, and support operations. The ETO may issue orders that cover a week or monthly time period. METT-TC will determine the targeting window for each ETO. For instance, brigade staffs training at the JRTC are coached to issue ETOs with two days of combat instructions, to begin planning those operations 96 hours in advance, and issue orders to subordinate commanders 36 to 24 hours prior to execution to facilitate battalion TF MDMP and troop-leading procedures. An explanation of the effects planning cycle will further define how the EWG and brigade staff conducts MDMP to develop an ETO.

Part 2: The Effects Planning Cycle

Figure 2-4 illustrates the effects planning cycle. Starting with the AOR assessment, the cycle clearly shows that the process is self-feeding and continuous. Additionally, the cycle shows the relevancy of the MDMP and

Figure 2-4

targeting methodology in the current environment and how the decision-making process is used to plan, execute, and assess operations that are effects-based. The effects planning cycle abbreviates the MDMP by eliminating the development of multiple COAs, thus making COA comparison obsolete. The decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting methodology is vital, and as described in **FM 5-0,** *Army Planning and Orders Production,* remains embedded within the MDMP.

The effects planning cycle begins with a brigade area of responsibility (AOR) assessment. This assessment is the first step of the MDMP – receipt of mission. During continuous operations, brigades will not normally have an OPORD or FRAGO to drive future operations, but rather, as stated in FM 5-0, the commander and staff utilize the higher commander's intent and anticipate future operations. Staffs determine the focus for future operations by analyzing past and current operations and the information environment. Commanders and staffs use subordinate TF commanders' assessments and individual staff estimates to determine the BDE AOR assessment.

AOR Assessment (Receipt of Mission) and Mission Analysis

The EWG forms to start the MDMP process for future operations (see agenda at Figure 2-5). It is based on subordinate units' assessments, intelligence assessments, and measures of effectiveness (MOE) trends. The EWG updates staff estimates. The EWG conducts mission analysis by analyzing MOE, situation reports (SITREP), intelligence summaries (INTSUM), open source intelligence (OSINT), assessments from previous ETO cycles, and the TF commander's assessment reports. The result is the

overall brigade AOR assessment. The staff sections that have an integral piece to this assessment are the maneuver and intelligence battlefield operating systems (BOS), the ECC, and the PCC.

Impact and Trend Analysis of the Campaign Plan

An impact and trend analysis is a constantly building snapshot of how, by location, the BCT is doing on meeting the military objectives of the joint force commander's (JFC) campaign plan. If managed properly, this analysis depicts success, potential growing friction areas, or problem areas within the

> **Effects WG Agenda**
> **Receipt of Mission & Mission Analysis**
> Review/Update Staff Estimates
> Analyze Event Template -- Determine AOR Threat Assessment
> Analyze MOE, SITREPs, INTSUMs, OSINT, and TF Commander's Assessment reports to determine objective and goal assessment
> Analyze higher OPORD/FRAGO/WARNO for impact
> Prioritize those objectives that are having the greatest negative impact on the brigade's AOR
> Based on available combat power, develop options to present to the commander at the morning or evening update.

Figure 2-5

BCT's AOR. Indicators, called measures of effectiveness (MOE) or criteria of success (COS), are used to gauge the success or failure of a campaign plan's military objectives. To further explain this process, a discussion of a campaign plan composition is in order.

Campaign Plan

JFC's campaign plan clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning (**JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations***). It describes what military or related political and social conditions (objectives) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (**JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning***). Commanders at the operational and tactical level use these outlined strategic goals and objectives to develop operations.

> **What's in the Campaign Plan?**
> **Goal:** Long-term achievements required to achieve a desired end state and set the conditions required for implementation of an exit strategy.
> **Objectives:** A measurable achievement that supports accomplishment of the goal.
> **Criteria of Success:** Information requirements developed during the operations process that measure the degree of success in accomplishing the unit's mission.
> **Supporting Tasks:** Desired effects -- whose achievements support the objective.
> **Measure of Effectiveness:** Quantifiable data (i.e., statistical) that indicate the effectiveness of actions in achieving the MOE/supporting tasks.

Figure 2-6

As outlined in Figure 2-6, a campaign plan consists of goals and objectives. To assist the commander in determining his success and/or on what and where to focus future operations, the JFC may list criteria of success, supporting tasks, and measures of effectiveness.

As stated in Chapter 1, commanders use the JFC's goals, objectives, and supporting tasks to develop their ground tactical plan. In order to establish and maintain information superiority, the JFC may direct subordinate commands to report their progress on achieving these goals and objectives using MOE or criteria of success. MOE are collected at the company level and analyzed by the battalion TF commander and staff. This analysis is incorporated into the TF AOR assessment, and the TF ECC channels the raw data with analysis to the brigade ECC. Example impact and trend analysis products/tools are detailed in Chapter 5.

SWEAT-MS Assessment

The PCC is responsible for developing the SWEAT-MS and CREG assessment. This assessment is a prioritized analysis by populace center in each TF AOR. As stated, priority of assessments and projects are level 1 requirements with secondary focus to level 2. The task organized CAT-A teams conduct the majority of these assessments. The ABE provides route assessments, and the medical officer provides an assessment of medical facilities and general populace health care. Figures 2-7 through 2-9 are example SWEAT-MS and CREG assessment products.

Current Infrastructure Assessment
Level 1: SWEAT-MS

Unit	Sewer	Water	Energy	Academic	Trash	Medical	Security
TF 1	R	R	R	A	A	●	A
TF 2	R	R	R	A	A	R	A
TF 3	R	R	R	R	R	A	R
TF 4	R	R	R	A	A	A	A

Operational Effectiveness:
Black = 0-49% Red = 50-69% Yellow = 70-89% Green = 90-100%

Figure 2-7

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
Current Infrastructure Assessment
Level 2: CREG

Unit	Civ Commo	Religion	Economy	Government
TF 1	R	R	R	R
TF 2	A	R	R	R
TF 3	A	R	R	R
TF 4	A	R	R	R

Operational Effectiveness:
Black = 0-49%   Red = 50-69%   Yellow = 70-89%   Green = 90-100%

Figure 2-8

District Priority of S.W.E.A.T. - M.S.

AO	Rpt. Agency	District	Sewage	Water	Energy	Academics	Trash	Medical	Security
AO Jackson	TF 1	RASSOURI	4	1	3	5	6	2	7
		SULIYAH	3	1	2	5	3	6	7
		HIKADIYAH	2	3	1	6	4	5	7
		SADIQ	2	1	6	5	4	3	7
AO Grant	TF 2	MOSALAH	3	2	4	5	1	6	7
		TAKIRA	3	6	4	5	2	1	7
		AKBAR	2	3	1	6	4	5	7
AO Sheridan	TF 3	JABAR NAHR	2	6	1	5	3	4	7
		WAHADI-AL-BASHA	3	1	4	5	2	6	7
		AL-BRUSHAR	4	2	1	5	6	3	7
		WADI-AL-TARIF	1	4	3	5	6	3	7
		MADELSAR	3	2	6	5	4	1	7

Figure 2-9

Mission Analysis Brief and Commander's Planning Guidance

The EWG presents the commander with a mission analysis brief based on the brigade AOR assessment and the anticipated populace and threat actions for the upcoming ETO cycle. As part of this brief, the EWG develops recommended ETO planning guidance, to include the problem or target set, for the commander's approval. A problem or target set is a situation that is affecting the BCT negatively and preventing the BCT from meeting the commander's end state. The EWG presents all problem sets to the commander and recommends which problem set the BCT should focus on during the upcoming ETO. The commander then issues planning guidance to the staff.

The mission analysis brief may substitute for the morning or evening battle update brief (BUB) or shift change brief. Regardless of when the brief is conducted, the battle rhythm must be structured so this brief is tied to the commander's update with higher and subordinate commanders. This allows the commander to take the mission analysis and recommended planning guidance developed by his staff and get input from his subordinate commanders and guidance from higher. After these two conferences, the commander can give concise planning guidance for a directed COA (see Figure 2-10).

EXAMPLE COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR EBO

Concept: In line with my DECISIVE OP (eliminate threat elements), I want to attack to destroy a quantifiable percentage of the FRE mortar threat in AO BEAR, specifically in AOs JACKSON and SHERIDAN, no later than D+7. Synchronize MAN/FIRES, CMO, and PSYOP to change behaviors and provide intelligence.

ISR: Focus collection on identifying the base of support (FRE C2 cell) and FRE activity within the districts of these AORs.

MAN and Fires: Attack the entire system of the FRE mortar system: mortar crew, cache, and base of support (C2).

IO: Focus on gaining the cooperation of the tribal and district leadership and the local populace, where the FRE find refuge, to eliminate FRE and/or provide information on FRE activity. Use CMO and "$ for information" as a means to change behaviors and provide intelligence.

CMO: Identify, resource, and provide those districts with the identified #1 SWEAT-related activity.

Figure 2-10

COA Development

After the commander issues his planning guidance for ETO development, the EWG meets again to conduct COA development (see Figure 2-11). This begins with a review of the commander's planning guidance. Next, the staff determines the end state, desired effect, or criteria of success for the problem set or target set. This determination, which acts as the base for

COA development, allows the staff to develop a COA to achieve that desired effect.

COA DEVELOPMENT

Review commander's guidance for upcoming planning cycle -- the problem/target set.
Determine the end state, desired effect, or criteria of success for the problem or target set.
Develop mission and intent to achieve desired effect or meet criteria of success.
Develop method (tasks to achieve) end state. This results in sub-task to the BDE task force.

Figure 2-11

Problem Set Analysis

The COA is built by "peeling back the onion" of the problem or target set. The staff must develop a COA that attacks the entire system of a problem. One problem-solving method is to draw out the issue, or problem set, and then identify the subcomponents of the problem (see Figure 2-12). It is vitally important to analyze the entire system; this includes not only the military aspect, but the civil aspect as well. When conducting offensive operations to eliminate insurgents in an urban environment, the majority of intelligence is derived from human intelligence (HUMINT). If a populace is allowing insurgents to operate in their town or district, the staff has to determine why. It could be because the populace does not feel safe or they are disgruntled about the lack of CMO initiatives. If the staff does not know the answer, then that information requirement becomes part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan.


Figure 2-12

By analyzing the TF assessment, the ECC's MOE analysis, and the PCC assessment, the staff may already know the answer and much more. This is where the staff begins to develop a COA to achieve the commander's desired effect for this ETO. If the staff knows where insurgents are operating, they can develop a plan to eliminate them and convince the local populace and civil/tribal leaders to provide information on insurgent activities.

Activities within the TF's AOR must support one another and be synchronized with the intent on achieving the brigade commander's desired effect. Based on available assets and resources, the staff begins to build and assign tasks to subordinate units. It may take months to achieve the desired effect on some problem sets. There will be actions that are near term and others, such as reconstruction or building a police force, that will take much longer. These problem sets and the assigned tasks to attain the commander's desired end state must be evaluated as a new ETO is being constructed.

Example: Insurgent attacks have increased along a supply route and associated districts. The staff begins to examine the *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *how* of the issue. Questions the staff can answer become synchronized tasks to subordinate units. Questions the staff cannot answer become part of the ISR plan. Figure 2-13 shows the analysis, desired effect, and actions needed to achieve these effects. The circles in blue are actionable, and the circles in yellow are information still needed.


Figure 2-13

From the results in Figure 2-13, the EWG begins to develop the proposed concept of the operation (Figure 2-14), and the targeting officer begins to fill in the synchronization matrix with unit tasks, purposes, and the specific SIR/SOR/MOE the unit must collect (see Figure 2-15 on page 32). Each task is given a unique target number for use as a tracking tool and assessment aid.

Example Proposed Commander's Concept of Operations

The concept for this ETO is to reduce IED attacks along RT STEEL by 50% NLT D+8. The BCT will accomplish this by attacking/engaging the entire system: FRE employing IEDs, bomb maker, financier, local authority, and populace involvement and support for US/coalition. The BCT attacks to reduce incidents of IED attacks against US/coalition forces in AO SHERIDAN and AO GRANT. TF 1 and TF 2 conduct attacks to capture/kill FRE employing IEDs along RT STEEL NLT D+4. TF 1 engages principal leaders of WADI-AL-TARIF and JARBAR NAHR; PMO assesses police forces in JARBAR NAHR and WADI-AL-TARIF; PSYOP will distribute handbills in WADI-AL-TARIF and JARBAR NAHR.

Desired effect: NLT than D+8, a 50% reduction of IED attacks along RT STEEL and an increase of 25% in the reporting of hostile anti-coalition activity by the local populace.

Figure 2-14

The results of the EWG's COA development are presented to the primary staff and act as an "azimuth check" for the EWG to make necessary changes before the brigade staff forms to synchronize the COA.

Synchronization Meeting

The brigade staff forms to synchronize the EWG's developed COA in time and space. The intent is for this meeting to be short — approximately two hours. For a successful meeting, commanders and staff should consider the following key points:

• Have a detailed agenda for each time period. Figure 2-16 shows an example agenda.
• Have all necessary staff members present to ensure the brigade has properly employed all of its combat power and that it is fully synchronized. See Figure 2-17 for an example roll call of recommended attendees.

SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX						
DECIDE			**DETECT AND DELIVER**		**ASSESS**	
TARGET #	TARGET	LOCATION	TASK	PURPOSE	SIR/MOE	STATUS
AG1000	Police Chief	SADIQ	NLT D+8, by SOI, co-opt to establish random TCPs NLT D+12 along MSR STEEL between 2300-0200 three times weekly (incl Friday) to search vehicles for FF/FRL elements, weapons, and IED material	To provide Iraqi self-governing and responsibility of district and re-establish a SASE.	-Number of TCPs established -Frequency of TCPs -Number of suspected FRE detained by police -Number and type of weapons and IED material captured	
AG1005	FRE employing IEDs	MSR STEEL	Search and attack: attack to locate and destroy FF/FRL forces NLT D+8.	To re-establish a SASE and ensure FOM along MSR STEEL.	-Number of IEDs along MSR STEEL -Number of FRE killed or captured -Number of IEDs located and neutralized	
AG1010	Tribal and community leaders and populace	SADIQ	By SOI, INFORM personnel of civilian casualties by IEDs and INFLUENCE them to report anti-coalition activity; distribute 150 handbills (JP102-$ for information resulting in the arrest of FF/FRL or notification of IED location) NLT D+8.	To gain information on FRE activity and re-establish a SASE.	-Number of civilians who report FF/FRE activity. -Number of FF/FRE killed or captured based on information obtained from populace. -Number of tribal and community leaders who speak against FF/FRE activity and promote US/coalition support.	
AG1015	$ for info campaign	SADIQ	PSYOP to conduct MOP/MOE assessment NLT D+25.	To determine success or failures of $ for into campaign and guage if populace feels a return of SASE	-Percent of populace engaged -Percent of populace who understand message -Percent of populace who agree with message -Percent of populace who will comply with message	

Figure 2-15

For Official Use Only

AGENDA
TO: Roll Call **XO:** Intent/Purpose of this Combat Power Sync Meeting
Situation Update

S2: Enemy update: PIRs, threat assessment, HVTs, ISR plan (current), BDA
S3: Current friendly situation
    --Assets available, task org, FRAGOs, combat power, current planned ops
    --Review CDR's intent
CMO/S5: SWEAT-MS assessment, priorities by district

Review/Assessment of Published ETC

TO: Review/Assessment of published problem sets
    --Published ETO
    --End state current task, MOE
    --Current ETO, MOE, CDR's guidance
    --Re-task ongoing problem set(s) if effects have not been achieved

Wargame Future Problem Set(s)

AS3 (Plans): Future problem set(s) to wargame
    --ID problem set(s)
    --Concept statement w/concept sketch, wargame and synchronization of ETO
XO: Review; develop ETO taskings

Figure 2-16

SYNCH MTG ROLL CALL	
CDR (if available)	ALO
XO (chairs)	TF LNOs
S3	Deputy Effects Coordinator (FSO)
S2	Targeting Officer
S4	Information Operations Coordinator
S5	PSYOP Planner
S6 (as required)	CA Planner
MICO Rep	Staff Judge Advocate
S2X	Public Affairs
PMO	ENG

Figure 2-17

To test the COA, utilize the action, reaction, counteraction for friendly, enemy, and populace. Ensure task and purpose are detailed. Each task and purpose should answer *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *why*.

     • Track troop-to-task-to-squad-level. Track assets that have been tasked so the staff does not overtask or undertask.

     • Determine or refine quantifiable MOE and criteria of success/desired effect.

Commander's Decision Brief and ETO Dissemination

Once the effects-based plan has been synchronized, the staff then begins to prepare the commander's decision brief. This brief serves as the handover between plans and current operations. The brief should basically follow the same synchronization agenda outlined in Figure 2-15. Once the commander has approved the ETO, the staff finalizes ETO production and issues the ETO. See Chapter 5 for an example commander's decision brief and ETO.

Example Battle Rhythm

The battle rhythm in Figure 2-18 was developed for a JRTC rotation. The purpose for showing the example is to put the ETO planning cycle in relation to time and space. Each step is numbered in the order the process takes place.

Figure 2-18

Task Force Planning, Execution, and Assessment

The cycle continues as the ETO is passed to subordinate units for planning and execution (detect and deliver). As missions are executed, the cycle enters into the most important phase – assessment. This is the one area where the BCT must maintain information superiority. It is imperative that the BCT establish procedures to capture the outcome of missions and the relevant day-to-day activities of the civilian populace. Chapters 3 and 4 outline how TF and company commanders execute the MDMP, mission briefs and debriefs, and TF assessments. Once missions are executed and the information is collected in the form of the TF assessment, the ETO cycle restarts.

Chapter 3: Battalion Effects-Based Operations

by CPT Bryan R. Jones and CPT Philip G. Jenison

"We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset."

United States Army: The Way Ahead

Given the vast amount of terrain and populace that a battalion commander must manage, adopting the effects-based concept allows battalion commanders to accomplish and maintain two things. First, it provides commanders the ability to focus forces to achieve battlefield effects – the end state on an adversary or populace, often a combination of the two. Second, it provides a method to plan future operations that are focused on achieving an objective and are proactive and holistic in countering the enemy. Developing holistic plans designed to achieve a desired effect allows the TF commander to organize all assets in time and space, massing lethal and nonlethal elements of combat power, and forcing the enemy to become reactive. Current TF structure is sufficient to execute effects-based operations, but it does require a modification in the way the commander and staff think. Commanders and staffs plan, execute, and assess fully integrated operations – using all elements of combat power to achieve overwhelming effects.

Shifting to effects-based operations at battalion TF level does not necessarily require changes to the staff organization. Understanding the dynamics associated with continuous combat and stability operations and support operations; realizing that information from every element executing an operation, such as a patrol, feeds future operations; and shifting focus from the enemy to effects on threats, populace, and civil/tribal leaders, are fundamental to achieving success on today's battlefield. They are the paths to accomplishing the theater commander's campaign plan.

In the current environment, an effects-based organization holds central the concept that every action taken or not taken sends a message to the population, insurgents, and external actors. Whether active or passive, such messages generate behavioral responses. Knowing this, effects-based units continuously evaluate and shape their words and actions to ensure they support operations designed to achieve the desired effect. Popular support and proper military action are complementary and feed off each other. Good effects-based operations that include nested civil-military operations

(CMO), information operations (IO), and military operations generate popular support and accomplish the mission set forth in the campaign plan.

Part 1: Staff Organization -- Battalion Effects Coordination Cell (ECC)

Due to the limited size of a battalion TF staff, real structural changes are not required. The most significant change is the fusion of the battalion fire support element (FSE), civil affairs team-A (CAT-A), S5, tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) team (TPT), public affairs officer (PAO), and staff judge advocate (SJA) into a battalion ECC (see Figure 3-1). The ECC at battalion level provides an element for the commander to focus CMO, fires, and IO to support maneuver effects-based operations. Unlike a brigade, there are no separate pre-combat checks (PCC) and ECC – those functions become one.

Figure 3-1

The battalion FSO becomes the effects coordinator (ECOORD) and leads the ECC. In addition to the duties and responsibilities outlined in Chapter 2, the BN ECOORD also synthesizes information sent by the company ECOORD, which includes: organized raw data from patrol debriefs that answers special observational requirements (SOR)/special information requirements (SIR), measures of effectiveness (MOE), general observations, and measures of performance. In sum, such information should relate how well the company is doing in its assigned task. The BN ECOORD uses the newly formed ECC to assist in collecting this data. The BN ECOORD, in conjunction with the planning staff, analyzes this information as part of the

TF commander's AOR assessment. Additionally, the BN ECOORD forwards the data and analysis to the BDE ECOORD.

AOR Assessments

AOR assessments provide vital feedback for the staff and drive future operations for the BCT. The battalion AOR zone assessment consists of three components: commander's assessment, intelligence assessment, and measures of effectiveness (MOE) trend analysis. The commander's assessment consists of the threat, population, local leadership, and infrastructure status and capability. The commander's assessment should be broken down by local district or town, with an overall assessment of the entire AOR. The commander considers all of these factors and provides a recommendation to the brigade commander and his staff for consideration during the next ETO planning cycle.

The intelligence assessment is a key part to the AOR assessment. The battalion S2 provides incident overlays of past and current ETO cycles, as well as a situation template (SITEMP) for the next ETO cycle. With this, the S2 manages, analyzes, and updates target folders. Target folders can provide a vast amount of information on targeted individuals if maintained properly. Critical to this is the ability to link analysis to identify regional, cultural, political, factional, and threat relationships among the populace. In part, this data enhances the overall terrain assessment.

MOE trend analysis (Figure 3-2) provides criteria to measure success of a campaign objective that directly supports a campaign goal. Usually identified in a quantifiable format, the collection of MOE provides trends to determine positive progress towards a stated objective or desired effect. The battalion ECC manages MOE products, conducts analysis, and subsequently forwards to brigade. Company ECCs extract raw data from patrol debriefs for input to MOE and intelligence assessments. Depending on the type of mission, it is not uncommon to see some portion of the MOE enclosed in the patrol debrief report.

Measure of Effectiveness

Goal 1: Gain public support for US/coalition forces and interim Iraqi government.

Obj 1a: General populace supports US/coalition efforts	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Number of ofensive gestures directed at US/coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians	10	12	9	7
Number of instances involving anti-US/coalition graffiti	9	11	8	7
Number of anti-US/coalition demonstrations	12	11	5	4
Number of pure-Iraqi events US/coalition representatives are invited to attend	4	3	5	6

Figure 3-2

Themes and messages provide a benchmark to establish MOE. Themes are general statements that support a JTF's mission. Messages directly support themes by providing specific messages or actions that are related to one theme. If successful, themes and messages normally remain consistent. If authorized by higher headquarters, brigade and battalion task forces create talking points for messages. Talking points are messages tailored to a specific mission and/or population center. Talking points are tailored to suit a target audience and always maintain the general theme and message established by higher headquarters. The PAO, tactical PSYOP team leader, and ECOORD may develop talking points. Those talking points are disseminated through units to the lowest level.

Currently, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), themes, messages, and talking points are the primary tools in the IO campaign. This common language allows commanders and staffs to ensure elements in the task force promote mutually supporting objectives. They also enable subordinate units to interface and collaborate effectively with various elements in their respective AOR while conducting routine operations. In effects-based operations, these tailored messages are ammunition for every soldier on the ground and should be included in the mission pre-brief.

Patrol Briefs and Debriefs

There are numerous feeding mechanisms for the pre-synchronization meeting. All provide valuable information necessary to understand a problem set and develop a plan of action. Patrol debriefs are an invaluable source of information that provide enormous feedback on daily activities throughout the entire battalion's AOR and its interaction among the populace or with the enemy. Debriefs should be formulated to answer commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR), SIR, and SOR. At the battalion level, debriefs are so important that the BN TOC should track them carefully, making sure that every patrol is debriefed and that the debrief is analyzed and passed to higher. This is *not* a small task and it cannot be ignored. Within COE, every element that leaves a forward operating base (FOB) should be considered a combat or reconnaissance mission. During the processing and analysis of patrol debriefs, both the S2 and the ECC provide a separate but equal analysis of the data. The S2 examines debriefs from an enemy and populace perspective, and the ECC examines the data to assist in gauging the progress the TF is having in regards to the campaign plan. Patrol debriefs are discussed further in Chapter 4. Taken together, and including combat assessment and company commander assessment, this data is used to create a TF AOR assessment.

In transitioning to an ECC, the battalion TF staff adds the battalion S5, a CAT-A team leader, a TPT leader, a battalion PAO, and a battalion legal representative. Specific duties for each staff officer mirror those of brigade. The ECC continuously updates staff estimates by tracking MOE, level 1 and level 2 assessments, and civil project status, and maintains contact folders detailing meetings with local leaders under established spheres of influence (SOI). With guidance from the battalion XO and S3, the assistant S3 plans officer, and assistant S2, the ECC becomes a mini-plans cell for the battalion. Operating within the battalion planning cycle, this group's focus is on the development of future operations.

Part 2: The Battalion Planning Cycle

The success of a mission can often be traced back to mission planning. Unit preparation for combat depends on the ability of commanders and their staffs to synchronize the elements of combat power within their battlespace. The Army's military decision-making process (MDMP) and targeting doctrine remain relevant; with proper application to effects-focused operations, doctrine enables commanders to achieve their desired effects.

Receipt of Mission and Mission Analysis

Figure 3-3

The battalion effects planning cycle (Figure 3-3) should closely mirror that of the brigade. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the brigade ETO cycle drives future operations and planning for the battalion staff. At the battalion level, the decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A) targeting methodology provides a framework for understanding and executing the battalion effects planning cycle. A cyclic process, it starts or restarts with the zone assessment and

receipt of the brigade's ETO FRAGO. The battalion staff begins mission analysis with the receipt of a FRAGO. The battalion does not need a brigade ETO FRAGO to develop future operations. Battalions can use this methodology to anticipate future operations. Additionally, the concept behind the BCT ETO FRAGO should not be unexpected. The battalion staff should be receiving constant updates from the TF LNOs and from guidance received via the brigade commander's conference calls. Combined with the current zone assessment, this data provides the information necessary for the staff to conduct mission analysis, develop a mission analysis brief, and recommend planning guidance for the commander. The battalion staff analyzes the ETO to determine the desired effect the brigade commander wishes to achieve and the specified and implied tasks necessary to achieve this end state. Based off the brigade commander's concept, the battalion staff updates staff estimates and develops recommended planning guidance for the commander. The mission analysis brief allows the commander to visualize his AOR and provide planning guidance to the staff. With that guidance, the staff then moves to develop a COA in the form of a pre-synchronization meeting.

Pre-Synchronization Meeting

The pre-synchronization meeting is where the true work of the battalion staff resides – COA development. Additionally, the meeting acts as a sort of pre-combat inspection (PCI) for the staff; it ensures the staff has the proper tools and products necessary.

During COA development, the ECC, the plans officer, and the battalion intelligence coordinator (BIC) assemble and develop the plan. This requires an understanding of the higher HQ's specified task from the brigade FRAGO in space and time. As discussed in Chapter 2, the problem set is the focus of COA development.

For example, if the brigade's intended outcome is a 50-percent reduction in insurgent activity within area of operation (AO) Jackson, then, in accordance with the battalion commander's guidance, the pre-synchronization meeting develops a COA to achieve that desired end state. The staff determines the necessary actions in time and space needed to achieve a 50-percent reduction.

As discussed in Chapter 2, a recommended TTP is to conduct mission analysis and build a COA using nodal analysis (Figure 3-4). Nodal analysis allows the commander and staff to determine what the components that are causing a problem are and, additionally, what actions will eliminate or reverse the problem. In this example, the staff considers the identity of the insurgents, their locations in the AOR, and their tactics and techniques and how they apply them, along with any other external influences. Are the

insurgents using direct fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortar attacks, or a combination of all to inflict violence? When are these events taking place and what are the civil response actions? Enemy IPB remains the same, but with additional factors of demography and leadership (both civil and religious). Staff planning focuses on what can and cannot be affected. This process builds the ISR plan. The BIC develops or refines the SIR/SOR so the staff can determine if the task's desired


Figure 3-4

outcome has been achieved and to feed necessary intelligence requirements. Additionally, the BIC focuses collection assets to answer unfilled information requirements. This facilitates intelligence driving maneuver. The S5 and CAT-A team leader assess level 1 (SWEAT-MS) and level 2 (CREG) factors and prioritize how those factors affect the desired objectives.

Once the staff determines the core and severity of the problem set, they shift focus to identify what can be done. Again using nodal analysis, the staff lays out the problem set, seeking the best approach to synchronize maneuver, fires (lethal and nonlethal), IO, CMO, and ISR to achieve the desired effect (i.e., 50-percent reduction). The ECOORD makes sure lethal fires complement nonlethal fires. If the staff identifies a religious leader as an insurgent supporter, the possibility of removing this figure forcefully must be carefully weighed. Based on the target folder for the religious leader, available intelligence on him, and pattern analysis, the staff may determine reasons for the religious leader's support for the insurgency. The staff may then target those factors, reducing the need or desire for the religious leader to continue support for the insurgents.

While formulating the proposed plan and as the staff templates a COA, the plans officer drafts a concept of the operation statement. As the group develops the concept of the operation, the staff determines tasks for subordinate units. A task and purpose must be detailed and answer *when*, *who*, *what*, *where*, and *why*. An example task and purpose could be the following:

NLT 041800JUNXX, A CO CDR conducts a bilateral (BILAT) negotiation with the Imam of Wadi-al-Tarif to confirm the Imam's allegiance by publicly speaking out in support of US/coalition forces and denounce and report insurgent activity in order to influence the local populace of Wadi-al-Tarif to support US/coalition forces and report insurgent activity.

The ECC uses the synchronization matrix to track modification to the taskings issued by brigade. This is done by further expanding the brigade target number to the company's or battalion's assets that will accomplish developed tasks. Once the COA is developed, the XO forms the battalion staff to test and synchronize the plan in time and space.

Synchronization Meeting

The synchronization meeting is focused on synchronizing critical events or phases within the ETO. This meeting focuses on critical events or phases inside a specific time period or cycle as opposed to just targeting high-priority targets (HPTs) independent of maneuver operations. The intent of the meeting is to quickly test a developed COA against the enemy's most likely COA and to ensure assets are synchronized in time and space to achieve the commander's desired effects.

The meeting starts with the S3 conducting roll call. All staff sections must be present and on time. The XO then states the purpose of the meeting and re-states the commander's planning guidance. The S2 reviews the enemy's most likely actions during this cycle and focuses on the enemy and populace situation that has driven the staff to develop this COA. The S3 and ECOORD then outline the concept of the operation that was developed during the pre-synchronization meeting. Then, utilizing action-reaction-counteraction, the staff tests and synchronizes the COA. IO and CMO can also be depicted using this method. Conducting a MEDCAP will cause what reaction? Not following up a cordon and search with an IO or CMO action will cause what reaction? This allows the staff to synchronize combat power and refine tasks.

Staff sections must come to the meeting prepared to speak in detailed task and purpose. Most taskings should have been identified during COA development, but if a staff member identifies a needed task, then that staff member needs to have the task and purpose written down on a 3 x 5 card (or the like) to pass to the individual capturing information. In an effort to reduce the length of the meeting, staff officers need to quickly explain the method to accomplish the identified task.

The S3 validates the current troop-to-task list, bearing in mind the new specified tasks each subordinate unit will execute. In stability operations and support operations, steady-state operations, such as fixed site security and route clearance, alter a unit's combat power for future operations. Before assigning additional specified tasks, staffs must evaluate the capacity of subordinate units already performing steady-state operations. Prior to closure of the meeting, a careful review of newly assigned tasks is updated on the maneuver synchronization matrix, collection matrix, and target synchronization matrix (TSM). Those targets still requiring effects remain active.

The maneuver synchronization matrix serves as a tool to capture the outcome of the meeting. During the meeting, the collection matrix is posted and completed along with the targeting synchronization matrix. Consider initially posting enlargements of these products to ensure all BOS representatives can see them and contribute to the process. The XO can ensure synchronization of all BOS areas by conducting a review at the end of each period of the maneuver synchronization matrix. The collection plan is summarized by phase or event for a specified period. From the TSM, ensure each HPT and target or tasking assigned by the brigade is addressed and that no assets are overtasked or undertasked. This helps guarantee nesting of the plan, and allows key leaders to verify that requirements are accurately translated into a tasking. Prior to dissemination, a joint review of the FRAGO should be conducted by the assistant S3, ECOORD, and S2.

Part 3: Staff Products

Staff preparation for the synchronization meeting is just as important as the meeting itself. Time in combat is invaluable to a commander and staff -- ***don't waste it!*** A single unprepared staff member affects the entire staff and, potentially, battalion operations. S2 preparation is critical! However, all staff members must do their homework; that means having the items listed below ready for use. At a minimum, the following are what each BOS element brings to the planning meetings (Figure 3-5):

BOS	PRODUCTS	BOS	PRODUCTS
BN S3	Changes to commander's intent Changes to task organization FRAGOs from higher HQ - analyzed Current combat power and troop-to-task Status of subordinate elements Status of planned operations Maneuver assets available (combat assessment)	BN S2	Current enemy situation (SITEMP) Enemy HVTs, COAs (event temp) Commander's PIR Status of R&S plan Proposed PIR
ECOORD	Current TSM Updated fire support execution matrix Proposed HPTs and locations Taskings from higher ETO/FRAGO Proposed themes and messages Updated MOE matrix assets available	BN S5	Project status matrix Updated SWEAT-MS and CREG assessments Population demographics overlay CMO allocation expenditure status (spent/projected cost)

Figure 3-5

Battalion Battle Rhythm

As stated earlier, the battalion effects planning cycle begins with receipt of an ETO or FRAGO from brigade as well as a battalion AOR assessment. The battalion must be integrated into the brigade planning cycle. Battalions must not be overtasked and must provide input to the brigade's ETO development. A good solid liaison officer (LNO) can make sure these concerns are addressed as a collaborative effort versus a react-to-contact drill.

The LNO serves as an early warning to the battalion for upcoming specified tasks and is the voice of the battalion during all brigade planning meetings. In addition, the LNO provides the status of previous tasks to subordinate units to the brigade ECC, preventing repeated taskings or overtasking by brigade to battalion. The LNO also provides flexibility to changes or upcoming events to the brigade's battle rhythm.

Battalions must establish a comparable battle rhythm to streamline the flow process. For example, if the brigade's targeting cycle (ETO) covers a 48-hour window of time, the battalion will conduct a synchronization meeting every 48 hours to plan operations for the next two days. To synchronize events in time and space, a careful review of the brigade

timeline must be considered. At the JRTC, the compressed rotational timeline forces units to develop a battle rhythm uncommon to that for theater operations. Figure 3-6 demonstrates a battle rhythm a battalion might use at the JRTC.

JRTC ETO Planning Cycle—Battle Rhythm										
ETO	16 Mar	17 Mar	18 Mar	19 Mar	20 Mar	21 Mar	22 Mar	23 Mar	24 Mar	25 Mar
Cycle	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6	D+7	D+8	D+9	D=10
ETOA	BDE MA / CDRs guidance / COA Dev	Synch MTG / Decision Bf / ETO FRAGO		BCT excute		TF assess		BDE timeline		
ETO	16 Mar	17 Mar	18 Mar	19 Mar	20 Mar	21 Mar	22 Mar	23 Mar	24 Mar	25 Mar
Cycle	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6	D+7	D+8	D+9	D=10
ETOA			TF CDRs Guidance / Pre-Synch	TF excute		Company assess		BN TF timeline		
		TF MA	Synch MTG / FRAGO							

Figure 3-6

Currently, trends in OIF and OEF vary among the myriad units that are in theater. However, many units typically assemble formally to conduct an abbreviated MDMP three times a week. With steady-state operations, units are engaged in lengthy operations where new operations orders are seldom published. Given the understanding of campaign goals and objectives, it is not uncommon to "frag" off the base order.

Summary

Effects-based operations at the battalion level is not a difficult or new process. This approach maximizes all available forces to produce total effects far greater than the sum of the individual efforts. Effects-based operations planned with a D3A methodology works the same way as traditional targeting. Some minor differences do exist; however, the differences do not alleviate the basics of traditional MDMP. The battalion TF focuses limited assets when, where, and on whom the commander and higher headquarters want targeted for the reasons so stated. Once synchronized, the staff issues a complete order to subordinate units to achieve the commander's desired effects on the battlefield. Effects-based operations seek to adjust the mindset and allow commanders and staffs to think outside the box.

Chapter 4: Effects-Based Operations at Company Level

by SFC (P) Robert Gray and CPT (P) Anthony Lugo

"Our enemy on freedom's frontier is adapting to our tactics everyday, so must we adapt and change our tactics to defeat this threat."

SMA Kenneth O. Preston

Execution begins and planning ends at company level. Company commanders focus on issuing orders, verifying pre-combat checks (PCC) and pre-combat inspections (PCI) are performed to standard, controlling operations, and ensuring debriefs are conducted after every mission. When battalion staffs issue effects-based orders, the company commander receives the task, purpose, and SIR/SOR for each mission. The company commander's role is to ensure each mission is executed, the purpose achieved, and SIR/SOR is answered to focus future battalion and brigade operations. Given the fact that a company has no staff, the company commander should turn to his traditional effects coordinator — the company fire support officer (FSO) — for assistance in managing these new information tasks.

The traditional role of the company fire support team (FIST) to coordinate lethal fires (effects) in support of a maneuver company has evolved to include coordination of both lethal and nonlethal effects. The company FIST coordinates nonlethal effects by developing SOI, tracking level 1 (SWEAT-MS) and level 2 (CREG) CMO projects, implementing specific information operation themes and messages and tracking their effectiveness, and acting as the company PAO. In addition, FISTs integrate nonlethal combat multipliers such as civil affairs teams (CAT-A), tactical psychological teams (TPTs), and human intelligence (HUMINT) teams. Company FISTs are organized to execute lethal effects.

Current trends at the JRTC during mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) for deployment to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations show that company headquarters fire support elements (FSEs) are not manned adequately to conduct 24-hour operations. The FSE also lacks the tools and systems to effectively conduct effects-based operations. They must brief and debrief patrols, track SOI, and maintain their capability to deliver lethal effects on a 24-hour basis.

Experience has shown that all convoys are combat operations and, as such, must be briefed and debriefed along with all other maneuver-centric patrols or operations. A company will have multiple SOIs to track and communicate within its AOR. The traditional method of operations used by company FISTs in a non-stability operations and support operations (SOSO)

environment are overwhelmed. Company FSEs must operate like a battalion fire support element or effects cell.

As the executor of a battalion or brigade effects-based operation, company FSEs must clearly understand the information required by the battalion ECC to plan those effects-based operations. This chapter clarifies the necessary TTP for company FISTs to effectively operate in support operations and stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Company Effects Coordination Cell (ECC)

The company team FSO is the unit ECOORD. He works with the company team commander during operations to successfully accomplish all company team-level essential effects tasks. While the maneuver commander is responsible for integrating lethal, nonlethal, and maneuver, the FSO must understand the scheme of maneuver as well as the company team commander understands it. On the basis of the commander's guidance, the FSO develops his effects plan and presents it to the commander for approval. To facilitate execution of effects-based tasks, the company commander reorganizes and consolidates his company FIST as the company ECC under the company headquarters platoon. The company FSO becomes the ECOORD and his duties and responsibilities include:

- Planning, coordinating, and executing effects-based tasks.
- Making recommendations/refinements to the battalion ECOORD on lethal and nonlethal requirements in the company AOR.
- Advising the company team commander on lethal and nonlethal matters, to include capabilities, limitations, and employment of all lethal and nonlethal assets available to support his operations.
- Conducting patrol briefs and debriefs at company level.
- Making recommendations to integrate effects into the maneuver commander's plan.
- Keeping key personnel informed of pertinent information (by spot reports, situation reports, and patrol debriefs), to include MOE, SOI status, and CMO project status within the AOR.
- Ensuring the IO plan and TSM are prepared and disseminated to key personnel, to include themes and messages, talking points, and MOE.
- Issuing guidance to the company FSE on the setup of the cell in the company command post (CP).
- Managing pertinent information, conducting assessment of the AOR, and reporting the status of nonlethal targets to higher and lower.
- Preparing the company commander for bilateral negotiations and media events.
- Maintaining capabilities to deliver lethal effects.

The company effects NCO's responsibilities should include:

• Keeping key personnel informed of pertinent information (by spot reports, situation reports, and patrol debriefs), to include MOE, SOI status, and CMO project status within the AOR.
• Tracking, managing, and compiling information at the company command post.
• Supervising the setup and operations of the company CP.
• Assisting in conducting patrol briefs, debriefs, and AOR assessment.
• Maintaining capabilities to deliver lethal effects.

The fire support specialist and radio-telephone operator (RTO) must be able to perform the duties and responsibilities of the company fire support NCO in his absence, but their primary responsibilities are to:

• Maintain staff journals (Department of Army Form 1594), reports, and manage information.
• Maintain communications with company elements and battalion.
• Maintain capabilities to deliver lethal effects.

When serving in support of heavy and mechanized task forces, the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) does not authorize a platoon forward observer; this is an added challenge to collecting timely and usable information. This is why it is vital for the company ECC to keep the platoon leader informed on lethal and nonlethal taskings through patrol briefs and debriefs at the company CP. The responsibilities of a forward observer serving with a light infantry platoon include the following:

• Refining or submitting key nonlethal targets for integration into the company plan.
• Assisting in patrol briefs and debriefs at platoon level.
• Keeping key personnel informed on pertinent information — SOIs, MOEs, and CMO project status — and the status of nonlethal targets.
• Ensuring themes, messages, and talking points are disseminated to every soldier in the platoon.
• Submitting input for the AOR assessment to the company FSO.
• Maintaining capabilities to deliver lethal effects.

Company ECC Operations in the Command Post

Company ECC operations need to mirror battalion operations. SOPs, tools, and systems to gather and manage information need to be in place to meet requirements from battalion. There is a need to have a dedicated lethal and nonlethal cell at the company CP. Without this element, critical information is not tracked, gathered, or managed in the detail required to be successful

in combat operations and the SOSO environment. To assist the company ECC in the analysis and execution of effects-based operations, the following TTPs and tools have been developed. Tools recommended for the company FSE are: patrol-tracking matrix, SWEAT-MS tracking matrix, SOI spreadsheet, and company effects summary.

The company ECC must be able to perform as the S2 at company level.
The ECOORD must analyze the ISR plan and determine the company's collection requirements, and then brief those requirements (along with the talking points and MOE during the mission brief) to focus patrols on gathering specific information critical to the planning and refinement at battalion and brigade. FSE themes, messages, and MOE need to be posted in the company for every leader and soldier to view along with PIR and SIR/SOR.

Company Patrol Tracking Matrix

In the past, companies traditionally executed missions as a company. In today's environment, there are several different missions a company is expected to conduct simultaneously, such as:

- Fixed-site security
- Traffic control points (TCP)
- Patrols
- Convoy escort
- Base security
- Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
- Specialty team escorts (CAT-A, TPT, THT, MEDCAP)

A patrol-tracking matrix is a tool recommended at the company FSE to assist in tracking effects-based operations as well as tracking maneuver and what missions they are currently executing. This tool can assist the company ECOORD in providing IO focus to squads/platoons on specific information requirements based on their mission.

For example, soldiers conducting presence patrols in a village or town are attempting to gather different information than company maneuver elements conducting convoy escort or traffic control points. The company ECOORD can now develop a specific patrol brief for each element based on their mission. The patrol-tracking matrix provides a time, mission, unit, specific SIR/SOR for the mission, and specific IO information requirements the company ECOORD hopes to gain, as well as assists in establishing a battle rhythm providing the ECOORD with an approximate time that patrol briefs and debriefs will be conducted. See Figure 4-1 below:

	MISSION	DTG	DTG END	OBJECTIVES	SOR/SIR	PLT Debrief	CO Debrief
HQ	Convoy Ops	05 0600 DEC03	05 1300 DEC03	Talking Points	N/A		
1 PLT	ASP, QRF	05 0600 DEC03	06 0600 DEC03	2, 8, 10	1, 3		
2 PLT	TCP1 (N)	05 0600 DEC03	06 0600 DEC03	1, 5, 8	2		
3 PLT	TCP2 (S)	05 0600 DEC03	06 0600 DEC03	1, 5, 8	3		
HQ	FOB OPS, CCP	05 1300 DEC03	UTC	Talking Points	N/A		
1 PLT	TCP1 (N)	06 0600 DEC03	07 0600 DEC03	1, 5, 8	3		
2 PLT	Patrol NAI23	06 0600 DEC03	07 0600 DEC03	1, 5, 8	1		
3 PLT	FOB/QRF/ SEC escort	06 0600 DEC03	07 0600 DEC03	2, 8, 10	N/A		

Figure 4-1

Patrol Briefs and Debriefs

It is imperative that the company ECOORD (FSO) conducts patrol briefs with all elements executing missions. Patrol briefs provide focus to the patrol on gathering specific information that may answer PIR or IO indictors. The patrol brief should include:

- PIR, SIR/SOR.
- Copy of MOE (indicators).
- Pertinent information gathered from previous patrols (usual or unusual behavior displayed). (Example: Previous patrols observed busy hours between 0900-1200 at the market place. Today the market place was empty — an indictor of unusual behavior.)
- Any specialty teams attached and their mission.
- What specific indicators to observe and report during patrol debriefs (propaganda, negative hand gestures, throwing objects).
- Nonlethal target status.
- Current CMO project status.
- Previous patrol activities (promises made) .
- Target folder review for AOR and updated during debrief to avoid IO fratricide.
- Themes and messages – provided to all leaders and soldiers.

• Talking points — developed specifically for mission. (Example: Possible water issues in town or traffic issues at the TCP. Each problem has specific talking points to assist the platoon leader or key leader in resolving debate.)

Upon completion of the patrol brief, the platoon leader and FSO should ensure all soldiers understand:

- Themes and messages
- Talking points
- SIR/SOR
- MOE (indicators) specific to AOR

Soldiers conducting patrols have the ability to establish a "ground truth" of local sentiments through interaction with civilians. In order to seize this "ground truth" for future targeting, it is critical to establish SIR/SOR:

- Ensures soldiers understand what information is important.
- Causes patrols to initiate contact with local populace.
- Provides specific focus as stated above.

Patrol debriefs are the preferred method for seizing "ground truth." Debriefs should be conducted by the company ECOORD upon completion of the patrols and involve all soldiers in the patrol. The company ECOORD and platoon leader who execute the patrol should report to the S2 with the patrol debrief report for additional questions. The debrief should focus on answering SIR/SOR. MOE extracted from the patrol debrief by the company ECOORD should be forwarded daily to the battalion ECOORD for review and utilized during the combat synchronization meeting. An example patrol debriefs report and MOE tracking matrix can be found in Chapter 5. The current status of CMO projects should be debriefed and updated as well. An example of a SWEAT-MS tracking matrix for company level is shown at Figure 4-2 below:

TOWN: Wadi-al Tarif	UNIT: A/x-xx IN	POC: A Co. FSO/Co CDR	DTG: 201900 MAR04		
SYSTEM	**ISSUE**	**ACTIONS**	**STATUS**	**CONTACT**	**PROMISED DUE DATE**
SEWAGE	There is no evident issue with the sewage.	N/A	N/A	Sheik Asim	21 Mar 04
WATER	CATA conducted a water test - results positive. The sheik stated that there was a problem with the pipes.	Rock 6 provided a temporary supply of water with water buffalo. CATA will submit a project request for repair to water pipes.	Water buffalo to town by 1st PLT. Waiting estimate and status from CATA of expected repair date.	Sheik Asim	21 Mar 04 - water buffalo delivered. Waiting date for estimate.
ELECTRICITY	Generator in town INOP.	Rock 6 promises to bring mechanics to assess condition of the generator. Looking into a backup generator.	Rock 6 called BN requesting gen. mechanic to WAT on 22 Mar 04 and requested back-up generator.	Mayor	22 Mar 04 for assessment.
ACADEMICS	School damaged; lacks school supplies.	1st PLT w/CAT-A conducted assessment and issued 100 dinars for school supplies.	CAT-A team leader submitted proposal for school repairs to brigade.	School admin	23 Mar 04 - more school supplies; no promise on school repairs.
TRASH	Trash buildup in streets.	FSO/CAT-A requested list of local personnel to hire. Rock 6 will provide truck in meantime.	Mayor owes proposed list of workers and est. cost to FSO on 22 Mar 04. Truck made first trash run on 21 Mar 04.	Mayor	25 Mar 04 hire locals and pay weekly.
EMPLOYMENT	Unemployment issues causing protests.	Meeting w/mayor and local key leaders on 25 Mar 04 to create jobs.	First step in process of hiring for trash pick-up.	Key leaders	25 Mar 04 meeting w/key leaders.
MEDICAL	Not enough doctors to handle medical requirements	Battalion PA and FSO conducting initial survey to determine additional requirements.	Assessment will be complete on 22 Mar 04.	Doctor	22 Mar 04
SECURITY	Continued theft of automobiles and businesses	Increasing joint patrols with local police.	Follow-up meeting with company CDR and mayor to discuss problem on 23 Mar 04.	Mayor	23 Mar 04

Figure 4-2

It is imperative that CMO projects are tracked in detail at company level. The SWEAT-MS tracking matrix is a valuable tool in tracking vital infrastructure and systems and providing the company commander and battalion staff with an accurate picture of the status, contacts, actions taken at company level, and promised date for completion. It assists the battalion staff with establishing priorities and focus within the AOR.

Sphere of Influence Establishment

Sphere of influence (SOI) is a non-doctrinal term referring to the establishment of a fixed transmitter/receiver relationship between a TF leader and a target audience key communicator. Barring exceptional circumstances, the designated TF leader conducts all interaction with a designated key local leader. Here is why we establish SOIs:

   • Allows the TF to speak with one voice to specific government officials, IGOs, and NGOs.

- Establishes a sound relationship with local officials.
- Assists local officials in knowing their primary and alternate POCs.
- Prevents IO fratricide (i.e., multiple engagements on one official, each obtaining a different outcome not in the interest of the maneuver commander).
- Prevents local leaders from manipulating multiple engagements to their benefit.

SOI spreadsheets are developed at company and consolidated at battalion to ensure continuity. See Chapter 5 for an example of a completed SOI spreadsheet.

Company Effects Planning Cycle

Figure 4-3

The battalion staff receives an ETO from brigade and produces a FRAGO and TSM tasking subordinate units to execute operations. At company level, the ECOORD reviews the document for target responsibilities and any additional effects tasks. Company-level troop-leading procedures (TLP) should include:

- Receive FRAGO and TSM from battalion to conduct operations.
- Company commander and ECOORD synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects into the scheme of maneuver, ensuring to integrate specialty teams into the plan. Patrol debriefs previously conducted provide a focus for effects planning.
- Company commander and ECOORD brief the battalion commander and ECOORD and receive further guidance.

- Company produces a FRAGO or order.
- Platoons conduct PCCs, PCIs, and rehearsals.
- ECOORD conducts mission brief, and company executes the mission.
- AOR assessment and debriefs are conducted from platoons consolidated by the company ECOORD and sent to battalion for analysis. The battalion staff conducts AOR assessment and sends to brigade for input to the next ETO cycle.

Using these TTP will allow a company ECC to effectively implement and manage effects-based operations and also allow the company ECOORD to assist the commander with the complex tasks associated with a SOSO environment.

Chapter 5: Tools, Products, and Rehearsals

by the JRTC Fire Support Team

This chapter is a collection of tools and products for commanders and staffs to use during effects-based planning and execution. These tools have been collected or developed over the past 18 months as the JRTC has observed units training for deployment or operating in SFOR, KFOR, OIF, and OEF.

Part 1: Brigade Products and Tools

Impact and Trend Analysis Tools and Products

The following tools and products are used to collect and analyze objectives and goals of a campaign plan. JRTC acquired these tools and products from the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) during their rotation in KFOR-4A and 4B. The spreadsheet has been modified slightly for brigade use.

- *Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) Spreadsheet* (Figure 5-1)

The top line identifies the campaign goal in blue, the associated objectives to each goal are in purple, and the MOE indicators aligned to each objective are in black. As discussed in Chapter 2, the MOE allows the force to track, by AOR and key terrain, where indicators are occurring and whether the unit is having success or failure with a particular objective. In accordance with the brigade's battle rhythm, each task force is responsible for reporting information for their AOR. This information is totaled for the BCT, and the data is fed into the trend analysis spreadsheet.

Measure of Effectiveness

Goal 1: Gain public support for US/coalition military forces and interim Iraqi government.			Obj A: General populace supports US/coalition efforts	Number of offensive gestures directed at US/coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians	Number of instances involving anti-US/coalition graffiti	Number of anti-US/coalition demonstrations	Number of pure Iraqi events US/coalition representatives are invited to attend	Obj B: Civilian leadership at district and local level support US/coalition efforts	Number of civil and religious leaders actively supporting US/coalition initiatives	Number of civilian or religious activities US/coalition representatives are invited to attend	Obj C: Promote confidence in CPA	Number of offensive gestures directed at the CPA by Iraqi civilians	Number of instances involving anti-CPA graffiti	Number of anti-CPA demonstrations
		BCT Total		1	4	6	7		0	0		0	0	0
AO	**Rpt. Agency**	**Key Terrain**												
Jackson	TF 1	**RASSOURI**		1		6								
		SULIYAH												
		HIKADIYAH			4									
		SADIQ					7							
		RT STEEL												
		RT PEWTER												
		RT GOLD												

Figure 5-1

• *Trend Analysis Spreadsheet* (Figure 5-2)

The trend analysis spreadsheet takes the historical information from the MOE spreadsheet and allows the commander and staff to visually see where positive and negative activities are occurring within the BCT AOR. From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, the staff is able to identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse the negative trend. The brigade can capitalize on the positive trends by determining what is causing that trend and apply that TTP with higher headquarters and subordinate TF commanders. The analysis from this product, along with the TF commander's assessment, CMO assessments, and intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), is used to develop the trend analysis slide and the impact analysis slide.

Goal 1: Gain public support for US/coalition military forces and interim Iraqi government			
Obj A: General populace supports US/coalition efforts	OCT	NOV	DEC
Number of offensive gestures directed at US/coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians	20	0	0
Number of instances involving anti-US/coalition graffiti	9	0	0
Number of anti-US/coalition demonstrations	12	0	0
Number of pure-Iraqi events US/coalition representatives are invited to attend	3	0	0
Obj B: Civil leadership at district and local level support US/coalition efforts	OCT	NOV	DEC
Number of civil and religious leaders actively supporting US/coalition initiatives	20	0	0
Number of civil or religious activities US/coalition representatives are invited to attend	8	0	0

Figure 5-2

• *Trend Analysis Slide* (Figure 5-3)

The trend analysis slide is a product created by the ECC that visualizes the assessment of objectives and goals of the BCT for the BDE commander. This product shows by time how the BCT evaluates each goal and objective. The bubbles and arrows are explained in the assessment methodology slide (Figure 5-4).

Figure 5-3

Figure 5-4

• *Impact Analysis Slide* (Figure 5-5)

The impact analysis slide is the second part of the ECC's overall visual assessment for the commander. This product shows the impact of upward or downward trends on the BCT. It does this by color-coding the TF AOR with a RED, YELLOW, or GREEN status and the events or indicators that have occurred to make that assessment. In this example, the entire BCT AOR is zoned utilizing the "horse-blanket method." This allows commanders to quickly focus and graphically control forces. This product is maintained by the ECC in collaboration with the CA and intelligence BOS.

Figure 5-5

Effects Tasking Order Products

Synchronization Matrix (Figure 5-6, page 64)

The target synchronization matrix (TSM) is a tool managed by the targeting officer that allows the staff to assign, synchronize, and track taskings to subordinate units. It allows the staff to determine success or failure for each tasking. If the BCT is failing to achieve the desired effect with a task, the staff can identify, analyze, and develop an alternate method to achieve the desired outcome. It will determine overall if the BCT is able to move to another problem set. For this reason there is one TSM per ETO or problem set. Once complete, the TSM basically translates over to "task to subordinate units" and to the ISR plan in the ETO FRAGO.

SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX						
DECIDE			DETECT AND DELIVER		ASSESS	
TARGET #	TARGET	LOCATION	TASK	PURPOSE	SIR/MOE	STATUS
TF 1						
NC1000	Police Chief	Suliyah	Conduct FTF meeting with police chief	To determine if he has any information related to mortar attacks	1. Are there any people who have moved into town within the last 30 days? 2. Is he aware of any men offering money for employment outside of the town?	
NC1005	Suspect MFP	TAI 100	Conduct a search and attack mission into TAI 100	To destroy any FF/FRE elements and capture any identified caches of ammunition or weapons	1. Were any FF/FRE engaged/observed? 2. Location of any caches found. 3. Number and type of weapons/ammunition found.	
TF 2						
NC2000	Police Chief	Wadi-al-Tarif	Conduct FTF meeting with police chief	To determine if he has any information related to mortar attacks	1. Are there any people who have moved into town within the last 30 days? 2. Is he aware of any men offering money for employment outside of the town?	
NC2001	Suspect MFP	TAI 105	Conduct a search and attack mission into TAI 105	To destroy any FF/FRE elements and capture any identified caches of ammunition or weapons	1. Were any FF/FRE engaged/observed? 2. Location of any caches found. 3. Number and type of weapons/ammunition found.	
TF 3						
NC3000	Police Chief	Mosalah	Conduct FTF meeting with police chief	To determine if he has any information related to mortar attacks	1. Are there any people who have moved into town within the last 30 days? 2. Is he aware of any men offering money for employment outside of the town?	
NC3001	Suspect MFP	TAI 110	Conduct a search and attack mission into TAI 110	To destroy any FF/FRE elements and capture any identified caches of ammunition or weapons	1. Were any FF/FRE engaged/observed? 2. Location of any caches found. 3. Number and type of weapons/ammunition found.	

Figure 5-6

For Official Use Only

• ***Effects Tasking Order – The FRAGO*** (Figure 5-7, page 66)

The example ETO FRAGO follows the basic five-paragraph orders format. Paragraph 1A is the enemy and civil situation that has driven the BDE commander to this ETO. Paragraph 3A explains the commander's will to use the elements of combat power to achieve overwhelming effects for this ETO cycle. Paragraph 3B details the task and purpose, answering *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *why*.

FRAGO:	1	ETO:	A	DATES:		REF:		TIME ZONE:		ZULU	DTG:			Copy:		Task Organization:	See Annex A

1. SITUATION

1A. Enemy:	The FRE have increased mortar attacks in AOs GRANT, JACKSON, and SHERIDAN. It is believed these increased attacks are attributed to the success the BCT is having on FRE employing IED and the capture of a bomb maker in 1st BDE AOR. Firefinder acquisitions and mortar reports indicate the mortar teams are operating in specific times. The teams in AO JACKSON are firing from 1900-2200 from NAIs 101d-101e and seem to be operating from a vehicle. The mortar teams in AO GRANT are firing from 0600-0800 from NAIs 101f-101g and seem to move by vehicle. The mortar teams in AO SHERIDAN are firing from 1700-2000 from NAIs 101a-101b and seem to be moved by a vehicle - most likely an ATV based off of terrain. It is believed that all teams are finding refuge within nearby districts of WADI-AL-TARIF, JABAR NAHR, MOSALAH, SADIQ, and SULIYAH. The populace is afraid to inform US forces of FRE activity and do not feel safe and secure. In response to SWEAT, the populace perceives that US forces are not responding to their needs and that we are fixing what US forces feel is priorty and not the district's priority.

1B. Friendly	No Change	(3). Adjacent Units:	

2. MISSION

No Change

3. EXECUTION

CDR's Intent:	No Change

3A. Concept of the Operation: The concept for this ETO is to attack to destroy the FRE mortar threat in AO BEAR, specifically in AOs GRANT, JACKSON, and SHERIDAN, no later than D+7. I want to attack the entire system of the FRE mortar system: mortar crew, cache, and base of support. To assist in the elimination of these elements, I want information operations to focus on gaining the cooperation of the tribal and district leadership and the local populace, where the FRE find refuge, to apprehend FRE and/or provide information on FRE activity. CMO will focus on identifying and providing these districts with the district's identified #1 SWEAT-related activity.

1. Maneuver	Search and Attack: NLT D+3, MAN attacks to kill/capture FRE mortar teams and locate and destroy the team's cache. Cordon and Search: Once identified, attack to kill/capture FRE C2 nodes.
2. Fires	Counterfire: NLT D+3, disrupt FRE mortar systems from placing effective indirect fires on US/coalition forces and key Iraqi infrastructure.
3. ISR	NLT D+3, focus of ISR is to identify FRE C2 and mortar activity.
4. IO	NLT D+4, co-op tribal and district leadership to increase efforts to locate and neutralize FRE operating within their SOE. NLT D+4, influence local populace with face-to-face engagements, handbills, billboard, and radio broadcast, emphasizing "$ for information" campaign to provide information on FRE activity.
5. CMO	NLT D+3, provide BDE with a prioritized SWEAT assessment by district. NLT D+4, BDE provides TF CDRs with project plans on district SWEAT initiatives.

3B. Tasks to Subordinate Units

TF 1	a. Search and Attack: NLT D+3, MAN attacks to kill/capture FRE mortar teams and locate and destroy the team's cache in NAIs 101d, 101e, & 101f IOT eliminate threat elements and establish and maintain a safe and secure environment. b. Cordon and Search: Once identified, attack to kill/capture FRE C2 nodes IOT eliminate threat elements and establish and maintain a safe and secure environment. c. NLT D+3 submit prioritized SWEAT assessment for the towns of X, Y, and Z in order for BDE to determine the necessary resources needed to begin projects and for TFs to use in bilateral negotiations. d. NLT D+5, in accordance with the BDE SOI, conduct BILATs to co-op xxxxx tribal and the XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX district leadership to increase efforts to locate and neutralize FRE operating within their SOI IOT gain information that will lead to the elimination of threat elements and establish and maintain a safe and secure environment. e. NLT D+4, emphasizing "$ for information" campaign through face-to-face engagements, influence 15% of the population in districts XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX to provide information on FRE activity. f. NLT D+4, emphasizing "$ for information" campaign, the TF CDR conducts a radio talk show with ZVOC radio on XX1000FEB04 IOT influence populace to provide information on FRE activity. g. NLT D+4, distribute 25 handbills (JP 101 "$ for information") in the districts of XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX IOT influence populace to provide information on FRE activity.

Figure 5-7

- ***Goals, Objectives, MOE, Themes and Messages*** (Figure 5-8, page 68)

       An attachment to the ETO FRAGO is the effected campaign goals and objectives. This document lists the goals and objectives this ETO will work to resolve. Additionally, it portrays the associated MOE to gauge the success of the ETO, and it gives the subordinate commanders the themes and messages to use while executing the ETO. During the task force MDMP, the TF commanders can take these themes and messages and create specific talking points for each task

EFFECTED CAMPAIGN GOALS AND OBJECTIVES	
Goal 3: Support US/coalition operations to remove or apprehend threat elements and neutralize resistance to US/coalition operations	**Goal 4: Promote a safe and secure environment**
OBJ 3A: Eliminate threat elements	**OBJ 4A: Maintain civil order**
Number of valid actionable reports from Iraqi civilians on threat element locations	General criminal activity decreases
Number of valid actionable reports from Iraqi civilians on threat element activities	Incidents of looting and car-theft decreasing
Number of threat elements successfully neutralized	Decrease in number of revenge killings
	Increase in the reporting of suspicious activity
OBJ 3B: Neutralize or gain the cooperation of non-compliant elements	Effectiveness and responsiveness of Iraqi police increases
Number of non-compliant religious or ethnic groups that have increased negative or hostile activities.	NGOs, PVOs, and IO freedom of movement without disruption increases
Number of religious or ethnic groups that remain steadily non-compliant	
Number of former non-compliant religious or ethnic groups that are in full compliance	
Number of former compliant religious or ethnic groups that are now non-compliant	
Themes/Messages (Goal 3)	**Themes/Messages (Goal 4)**
(a) Iraqis who support former regime loyalists or insurgents are criminals and against the principles of a sovereign, democratic Iraq.	(a) US/coalition forces are establishing legitimate courts, free from political pressure and corrupt influence.
(b) Every day we are capturing or killing those responsible for attacks on US/coalition forces.	(b) The new Iraqi security forces will safeguard the rights of all Iraqis.
(c) Threat elements are indiscriminate murderers responsible for the deaths of innocent Iraqi women and children.	(c) IEDs do not discriminate.
(d) Threat elements will be destroyed at every opportunity.	(d) Terrorists involved in IED attacks are murderers.
(e) Resistance groups and saboteurs delay recovery efforts and ultimately hurt Iraq.	

Figure 5-8

- ***Spheres Of Influence (SOI) Spreadsheet*** (Figure 5-9)

SOI is a non-doctrinal information term referring to the establishment of a fixed transmitter/receiver relationship between a TF leader and a target audience key communicator. Barring exceptional circumstances, the designated TF leader conducts all interaction with a designated key local leader. Establishing an SOI spreadsheet is a brigade responsibility that is a long and tedious process, but necessary to prevent IO fratricide. U.S. Army units participating in KFOR developed the SOI spreadsheet. This current version was revised by the 30th ESB during their mission readiness exercise. Consider the SOI spreadsheet as consolidating four things: (1) district or town overview; (2) key figures within that district or town; (3) primary and secondary engagers designated from the TF, their role, and how often the primary engages the SOI; and (4) what means, talking points, and MOE the engager has to affect behavior.

Sadiq (VQ877431)   AO Jackson/TF 120

Sadiq is a poor Shi'a neighborhood in the Talatha district. Many families supplement their diets by combing local garbage dumps.
The city contains 1 mosque, 4 schools. 3 medical clinics, 1 service station, 1 bank, 6 district headquarters, and 1 power substation. 25-30 pax.
Sadiq has no water system or wells and no electrical power grid.
The deputy mayor, Tamam Qutaybah, is anti-coalition. He believes the people will re-elect him as mayor when the CPA leaves. He also supports the local Imam, Adnan al-Mousiyi, who preaches a return to an Islamic state.
City Analysis: Sadiq is anti-coalition because the local Imam, Adnan al-Mousiyi, preaches against westernization. 3% Sunni Arab/95% Shi'a Arab/2% Kurd

AO	Unit	Town	Town Affinity	Occupation	Name	Affinity	Religion/ Ethnicity	Notes	Primary	Role	Secondary	Role	ENG
									Engagement Criteria				
Jackson	TF1	Sadiq	Anti-C	Mayor	Waseem Ubaid	Pro-C	Shi'a	Ubaid supports CPA as long as they help the citizens.	1 PLT PL/A Co	D	A CO CDR	O	W
Jackson	TF1	Sadiq	Anti-C	Deputy Mayor	Tamam Qutaybah	Anti-C	Shi'a	He wants the CPA the country, now		D	A CO CDR	O	D
Jackson	TF1	Sadiq	Anti-C	Police Chief	Gamal Hilel Jawhar	Pro-C	Shi'a	He will do the best he can. Not hesitant to call upon the Americans for assistance. He is anti-al-Sadar.	1 PSG/A CO	D			W
Jackson	TF1	Sadiq	Anti-C	Sheik	Sheik Fouad Satwa	N	Shi'a	He cooperates with Imam Mousiyi and coordinates his effort with the Shi'a.	A CO CDR	D	1 PLT PL/A CO	OW	M
Jackson	TF1	Sadiq	Anti-C	Imam	Adnan al-Mousiyi	Anti-C	Shi'a	He is a strict fundamentalist Shi'a Imam who supports al-Sadr and has Mahdi army soldiers guarding his mosque.	BN Chaplain	D	THT	S	W

D = Direct
O-Oversight
S = Support
OW = Overwatch

D = Daily
O = Weekly
M = Monthly
AN = As Necessary

30th ESB themes	Means of influence:
	Current IO themes:
	Measures of effect:

Figure 5-9

Crisis Action Planning – Current Operations

The crisis action team (CAT) is part of the current operations cell and is formed by the battle captain to plan immediate operations derived from intelligence or in response to an enemy action or other significant activity (i.e., bus accident with multiple casualties and civil infrastructure not in place to react to the incident) (see Figure 5-10). The ability to call audible and flex according to enemy actions are critical to successful combat operations.

To facilitate unforecasted events, the battle drills (Figures 5-11 to 5-17) on the following pages were developed by III Corps, 3-2 IN (Stryker Brigade) and KFOR elements to streamline the planning process. These battle drills are designed to serve as the basis for planning during activation of a CAT. The CAT should conduct an after-action review (AAR) and update each battle drill upon completion of the event that activated the CAT. The information contained in the drills must not be taken as a final and complete plan. The battle drills contain only generic tasks and purposes that must be refined to develop a concept that best addresses the event that has occurred.

Figures 5-18 to 5-20 are examples of areas/events that delineate staff coordination (key personnel and appropriate actions) and possible outcomes.

Crisis Action Team - CAT

Purpose is to plan immediate operations derived from intelligence or a reaction to significant activity
Day and night team or on call team
Develop battle drills -- based on lessons learned and known TTP
Use IO to
-- Shape the operation
-- Reinforce/exploit success
-- Build plan for "BAD news"
Collateral damage
Civilian casualties
o Disruption to civilian life
-- Deter future hostile acts by shaping behavior

Figure 5-10

Insurgent-Related Violence Battle Drill			
Concept: IO limits populace support for insurgent forces.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
TFF Cmd Group	Engage key regional and local leaders.	Reduce support for insurgency forces. .	Political leaders Civil leaders Hard-liners/extremists
PSYOP	Disseminate PSYOP print products to villages in and around insurgent area.	Reduce populace support for insurgent forces and activities.	Local populace
CA	Assess local leader and populace attitudes.	Gauge public opinion/response to insurgency activity.	Civil leaders Local populace
PA	BPT issues press releases.	Disseminate factual information to counter misinformation and propaganda.	Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace
	BPT conducts press conference.	Inform populace that coalition does not support any insurgent groups or activities.	Local populace
Maneuver	Engage key regional and local leaders.	Reduce support for insurgency forces.	Political leaders Civil leaders Hard-liners/extremists
	Disseminate PSYOP print products.	Influence attitudes towards insurgency activities.	Local populace
End state: Popular support for insurgent activities and violence are neutralized.			

Figure 5-11

MSR Blockage Battle Drill			
Concept: Influence local leaders and populace to clear the MSR and not interfere with coalition operations.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
TFF Cmd Group	N/A	N/A	N/A
PSYOP	Provide one TPT direct support to maneuver forces.	Facilitate crowd control.	Demonstrators/ protestors
	Engage demonstrators.	Influence demonstrators to clear the route and comply with the rule of law.	Demonstrators/ protestors
	Conduct face-to-face operations with local populace.	Reduce civilian support for the demonstration.	Local populace
CA	Engage demonstration leaders.	Mediate a resolution to the problem.	Demonstration leaders
	Assess local leader and populace attitudes after demonstrations end.	Gauge public attitudes toward coalition forces.	Civil leaders Local populace
PA	N/A	N/A	N/A
Maneuver	Engage demonstration leaders.	Mediate a resolution to the problem.	Demonstration leaders
	Engage demonstrators.	Enhance freedom of movement/crowd control.	Local populace
	Conduct face-to-face operations with local populace.	Reduce civilian support for the demonstration.	Local populace
End state: MSR is cleared; BCT operates without hindrance in sector.			

Figure 5-12

Violent Demonstration Battle Drill			
Concept: Influence local leaders and populace to discontinue their violent protests/ demonstrations, setting the conditions for a return to safe and secure environment.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
TFF Cmd Group	N/A	N/A	N/A
PSYOP	Provide one TPT direct support to maneuver forces.	Facilitate crowd control.	Demonstrators/ protestors
	Broadcast radio messages.	Warn of possible sanctions to be imposed against the populace.	Local leaders Local populace
CA	Engage local leaders.	Elicit and maintain support in dissuading violence and identifying instigators.	Political leaders Civil leaders
	Engage demonstration leaders.	Mediate a resolution to the problem.	Demonstration leaders
	Engage local municipal administrator.	Gain support for posible sanctions against populace.	Local leaders Local populace
	Assess local leader and populace attitudes after demonstrations end.	Gauge public attitudes towards coalition forces.	Civil leaders Local populace
PA	BPT issues press releases.	Disseminate factual information to counter misinformation and propaganda.	Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace
Maneuver	Engage demonstration leaders.	Mediate a resolution to the problem.	Demonstration leaders
	Disseminate PSYOP print products and conduct face-to-face operations.	Influence populace to cease violent activity.	Local populace
End state: The local populace does not engage in violent activities that interfere with or degrade BCT efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment.			

Figure 5-13

Cordon and Search Battle Drill

Concept: IO deters interference and limits adverse reaction by local populace to cordon and search operations. BPT exploit illegal arms/contraband seizure. O/O exploit BCT assistance provided to the local populace.

Element	Task	Purpose	Target Audience
TFF Cmd Group	N/A	N/A	N/A
PSYOP	Provide one TPT direct support to maneuver forces.	Facilitate crowd control.	Demonstrators/ protestors
	Conduct face-to-face operations with local populace in and around c/s operation.	Reduce civilian interference.	Local populace
	Prepare and disseminate leaflets to populace in and around c/s operation.	Inform populace of activities associated with c/s operation.	Local populace
		Exploit success of operation and gain future assistance from populace.	Local populace
	Develop and broadcast messages on radio stations.	Provide factual information about operation.	Local populace
CA	Assess local leader and populace attitudes after conclusion of operation.	Gauge public opinion/response to entry of BCT troops and seizure of illegal material.	Civil leaders Local populace
PA	BPT conducts press conference upon completion of operation.	Generate positive and factual media coverage of operation and coalition effort to maintain a safe and secure environment.	Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace
	Issue press release upon completion of operation.	Generate positive and factual media coverage of operation and KFOR effort.	Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace
Maneuver	Disseminate PSYOP leaflets in and around c/s operation.	Reduce civilian interference.	Local populace

End state: Suspected cache site(s) cleared, weapons and illegal goods confiscated with minimal interference and documented, with the public informed of progress towards a safe and secure environment. BCT IO postured to assist local populace.

Figure 5-14

Employment of QRF Battle Drill			
Concept: IO supports deployment of the QRF by displaying BDE capabilities and resolve, and supports U.S. operations to return the sector to a stable, peaceful environment.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
TFF Cmd Group	N/A	N/A	N/A
PSYOP	TPT accompanies QRF commander to provide public address and face to face.	Highlight BDE capabilities and resolve to maintain a safe and secure environment.	Local leaders Local populace
		Ensure populace does not interfere in QRF operations; reinforce approved themes.	Local populace
CA	Conduct follow-up interaction/damage control.	Repair/re-establish rapport with population.	Key leaders
PA	Issue press release upon completion of operation.	Focus media attention on the capabilities of the QRF.	Local populace Local media
Maneuver	Engage local populace in area where QRF deploys.	Ensure populace does not interfere in QRF operations.	Local populace
End state: BDE's capabilities and readiness are demonstrated. BDE returns to steady-state operations within the sector.			

Figure 5-15

Violent Act (Murder, Bombing, etc.) Battle Drill			
Concept: In response to a violent act in AOR, BDE disseminates factual information about incident. Disseminates anti-crime messages to influence local leaders and populace to renounce violent crime and its perpetrators and to assist police with post-incident investigation.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
PSYOP	Prepare and broadcast radio messages.	Inform populace of factual information concerning the incident, disseminate messages condemning the violence, and request the populace's assistance in solving the crime.	Local leaders Local populace
	Prepare leaflets.	Disseminate messages condemning the violence and requesting the populace's assistance in solving the crime.	Local populace
CA	Engage local leaders.	Influence to publicly renounce the violent act.	Political leaders Civil leaders
PA	Issue press release.	Inform populace of factual information concerning the incident, and disseminate messages condemning the violent act.	Local populace
Maneuver	Engage local leaders.	Influence local leaders to speak out against the violent act.	Political leaders Civil leaders
	Conduct face-to-face operations.	Disseminate messages condemning the violence and requesting the populace's assistance in solving the crime.	Local leaders Local populace
	Disseminate PSYOPS leaflets.	Disseminate messages condemning the violence and requesting the populace's assistance in solving the crime.	Local populace
	Increase troop presence.	Demonstrate BDE's resolve to prevent and solve the crime.	Local leaders Local populace
End state: Reduce local populace acceptance of violent crime and tolerance for those who perpetrate crimes. Increase populace assistance to local police and BDE.			

Figure 5-16

Friendly Forces Incident (Criminal Act, Violation of ROE, etc.) Battle Drill			
Concept: In response to an incident in the AOR involving friendly forces, IO disseminates factual information about incident and publicizes investigation of incident, stressing timeliness, fairness, and impartiality of investigation.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
PSYOP	Prepare and broadcast radio messages.	Inform populace of factual information concerning the incident and investigation.	Local leaders Local populace
	Prepare leaflets/handbills.	Disseminate messages to inform populace of incident and reassure populace that the issue is being addressed.	Local populace
CA	Engage local leaders.	Reassure that the action is unacceptable and the issue is being addressed.	Political leaders Civil leaders
PA	Issue press release.	Inform populace of factual information concerning the incident and invesigation.	Local populace
Maneuver	Engage local leaders.	Reassure leaders that the command does not support the action and the issue is being addressed.	Political leaders Civil leaders
	Conduct face-to-face operations.	Disseminate messages condemning violence and requesting the populace's assistance in solving the crime.	Local leaders Local populace
	Disseminate PSYOPS leaflet/handbills.	Disseminate messages to inform populace of the incident and reassure populace that the issue is being addressed.	Local populace
	Ensure ROE/ unacceptability of the act are disseminated to all soldiers in the command.	Prevent reoccurrence of incident.	
End state: Populace awareness of the incident and acceptance of TF handling of the matter increase. Demonstrations against U.S. forces/incident decrease.			

Figure 5-17

Area	EVENT	Staff Lead	Key Personnel	Actions	Desired Outcome	Outcome if not addressed	Remarks
Perception Management	Adversary blames US for renewed aggression in area; claims US wants to block rightful annexation	IO/PSYOP	CMD GRP	If available, speak to local political leaders. Coordinate actions with US Govt. reps as required.	US regains positive opinion in world press and gains confidence of local populace.	World opinion begins to turn against US presence in region.	
			IO Cell	Determine feasibility of destroying/denying propaganda production/dissemination means and synchronize/nominate targets for attack as required. Prepare input to S3 FRAGO; update IOSUM.		World opinion remains against US; populace turns against US and local governments.	
			PAO	Press release with approved messages.			
			PSYOP	Counter propaganda with approved themes and messages.			
			S5	Coordinate with PSYOP for approved messages. Facilitate command grp meeting with local authorities.			
			S2	Identify source and means of propaganda transmission.			
			S3	Publish FRAGO as required.			

Figure 5-18

Area	EVENT	Staff Lead	Key Personnel	Actions	Desired Outcome	Outcome if not addressed	Remarks
Collateral Damage to Civilans	Incident of unknown artillery fires killing civilians. NGOs report civilians being used as human shields.	S5/PSYOP	S5	Coordinates w/PSYOP/PAO to publicize efforts to limit civilian casualties. Interfaces with local HN authorities to provide facts and assure them of III Corps conformity to law of land warfare and international conventions.	Investigation on possible collateral damage; exploit enemy use of civilians as shields. PSYOP exploitation; no negative reaction by indigenous personnel against friendly forces.	Enemy propaganda exploitation of US collateral damage; indigenous personnel create problems for friendly forces.	
			SJA	Coordinate w/ PAO/PSYOP/S5 to publicize laws of warfare.			
			PSYOP	Counter propaganda with approved themes and messages.			
			PAO	Press release publicizes efforts to limit civilian casualties.			
			CMD GRP	Interface with local leaders to provide facts and influence to convince HN populace of positive aspects of brigade operations.			

Figure 5-19

Area	EVENT	Staff Lead	Key Personnel	Actions	Desired Outcome	Outcome if not addressed	Remarks
Dislocated Civilians	Adversary DCs moving in zone. Insurgents infiltrating among civilians.	S5/PSYOP	PAO	Approved press releases detailing humanitarian efforts.	DCs controlled, moved out of harm's way; insurgents identified and neutralized; movement not delayed; BDE receives intel.	Enemy gains information from local leaders and populace; BDE movement delayed; infiltrators conduct acts of sabotage.	
			S5	Lessen impact of dislocation. Contact HN support. Emphasize stay put themes with local authorities.			
			PSYOP	Approved themes and messages to limit DC interference of friendly ops, and advise to stay away from MSRs.			
			OPSEC	Ensure operations and plans in zone are not compromised.			
			S4	Coordinate with S5 for possible need for support in handling DCs.			
			PMO	Control movement of DCs in zone; search for evidence of infiltrators. Detain and evacuate infiltrators for processing.			
			S2	Ensure DCs are interrogated to identify infiltrators and to assess knowledge of friendly operations.			
			Surgeon	Monitor civilians for possible need for medical care.			

Figure 5-20

Part 2: Battalion and Company Tools and Products

MISSION DEBRIEF FORM
UNIT: **TOWN/CHECK POINT:**   **GRID:**
MISSION LEADER: (Rank, Last Name, First Name)
MISSION START/STOP DTG: (DD/HHHH/MMM/YYYY TO DD/HHHH/MMM/YYYY)
(EX: 01 1045 JUL 2002 TO 01 2245 JUL 2002)
MISSION TASK: (Put task defined in your mission order packet in this space)
ATTITUDE TOWARDS KFOR: (SELECT ONE)
FAVORABLE / UNFAVORABLE / NEUTRAL (If unfavorable, describe why)
CAN YOU ANSWER ANY OF THE PIR BELOW? (If YES, fill in the PIR answer; if NO, fill in any PIR-related information discovered during your mission)
PIR #1: PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PEOPLE OR GROUPS UPSETTING THE SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT
PIR ANSWER/INFORMATION:
PIR #2: PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EVENTS WITH POTENTIAL TO UPSET SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT
PIR ANSWER/INFORMATION:

PIR #3: PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PEOPLE OR GROUPS WHO MIGHT HARM KFOR
PIR ANSWER/INFORMATION:

PIR #4: PROVIDE INFORMATION ON VIOLATIONS OF THE MTA OR STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
PIR ANSWER/INFORMATION:

LIST ANY PHOTOS TAKEN DURING THE MISSION: (Include a simple description of the subject. Example: Subject is man named Baci and the camera assigned photo number is M30015; your entry should be: BACI - M30015.)	
1.	6.
2.	7.
3.	8.
4.	9.
5.	10.
.	

LIST PEOPLE CONTACTED OR KEY PEOPLE IDENTIFIED DURING THE MISSION: (In remarks include political party, address/phone number, and photo number if taken.)		
NAME (Last, First, MI)	ETHNICITY	REMARKS
1.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
2.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
3.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
4.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
5.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	

LIST SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES ENCOUNTERED DURING THE MISSION: (In remarks include significance of vehicle, VIN number, make, model, tag number, color, and photo number if taken.)

OWNER (Last, First, MI)	ETHNICITY	REMARKS
1.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
2.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
3.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
4.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	
5.	SUNNI / SHIA / OTHER	

DID YOU SEE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING DURING YOUR MISSION?

VANDALISM: YES or NO (If YES, fill in the information below)

WHAT WAS VANDALIZED?
WHO OWNS THE OBJECT VANDALIZED?

WHAT IS THE OWNER'S EHTNICITY? K-ALB / K-SERB
WAS A PHOTO TAKEN?

DESCRIBE THE VANDALISM

GRAFFITI: YES or NO (If YES, fill in the information below)

WHAT WAS THE GRAFFITI ON?
WHO OWNS THE OBJECT WITH GRAFFITI ON IT?

WHAT IS THE OWNER'S ETHNICITY? K-ALB / K-SERB
WAS A PHOTO TAKEN?

DESCRIBE THE GRAFFITI

POSTERS/FLYERS: YES or NO (If YES, fill in the information below)
WHAT WAS THE POSTER/FLYER ON?   WHO OWNS THE OBJECT WITH THE POSTER ON IT?
WHAT IS THE OWNER'S ETHNICITY? K-ALB / K-SERB   WAS A PHOTO TAKEN?
DESCRIBE THE POSTER/FLYER
GANGS/HANGOUTS: YES or NO (If YES, fill in the information below)
WHERE IS THE HANGOUT?   WHO OWNS THE PLACE OF THE HANGOUT?
WHAT IS THE GANG'S ETHNICITY? K-ALB / K-SERB   WAS A PHOTO TAKEN?
DESCRIBE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GANG AND APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY ARE IN THE GANG
UPCOMING EVENTS IN THE AREA: YES or NO (If YES, fill in the information below)
WHAT IS THE UPCOMING EVENT?   WHERE WILL IT BE?
WHAT IS THE ETHNICITY? K-ALB / K-SERB   WHEN WILL IT BE?
DESCRIBE THE PLAN FOR THE EVENT AND APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL ATTEND

USE THIS SPACE FOR OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS NOT ALREADY DESCRIBED

PATROL TRIP TICKET
MISSION
UNIT CALL SIGN
DTG OF DEPARTURE
ETR DTG
VEHICLE BUMPER #
EIS #
MISSION LEADER NAME
MISSION LEADER SIGNATURE
CO / XO / 1SG / PL / PSG NAME
CO / XO / 1SG / PL / PSG SIGNATURE
TOC SHIFT NCO NAME
TOC SHIFT NCO SIGNATURE
Note 1: All mounted patrols will leave base camp with at least one fufnctioning BFT.
Note 2: All patrols will complete a mission packet prior to SP and a debrief after RP regardless of the nature of the reason for leaving the base camp. This means log pack or laundry runs.
Note 3: All patrols are required to give a radio check to include an 8 digit grid every hour.

NAME	UNIT	WPN/SER ITEM	SERIAL #

Part 3: Rehearsals

Rehearsals are a vital element to success. Army leaders are very familiar with proven techniques to rehearse combat operations; they must now also become comfortable rehearsing bilateral negotiations (BILATs), CMO, PSYOP, and CA team actions occurring simultaneously or sequentially with combat operations.

For years during traditional combat rotations at the JRTC, BCTs commonly rehearsed key events such as movement to the objective area, passage of lines, establishment of the breach, and assault of the objective. Army leaders use techniques such as this to allow commanders to visualize the plan in time and space, identify conflicts, and ensure each unit understands the actions of the units to their left and right and how these actions affect their own operations.

The same principles still apply in the new environment. A cordon and search in one unit's AOR may affect an adjacent unit's AOR. The BCT's plan to employ CAT-A teams to conduct assessments of infrastructure must be de-conflicted with the actions of subordinate units. The establishment of a fixed checkpoint may cause increased traffic flow in an adjacent unit's AOR. The results of a BILAT with a tribal leader may have an effect in several units' AORs. These all now become key events to discuss during rehearsals.

A good technique is to use the TSM as a rehearsal tool. When completed properly, either at brigade or battalion level, this document contains all key events, to include offensive combat operations, for a given time period. Discussing each action and its detailed task and purpose, timing, unit designated to execute the task, and SIR/SOR provide the necessary level of detail to ensure synchronization in time and space. This technique will allow leaders to ensure the plan is synchronized and understood by subordinate commanders, and allow adjacent commanders the ability to anticipate how the actions of adjacent units will impact their own AOR.

For years the field artillery community has used the acronym PLOT-CR (purpose, location, observer, trigger, communications, and rehearsal) to rehearse targets. The acronym DTPLUSI (said - *DT plus I*) is a useful technique to rehearse effects targets.

D - Date/time group
T - Task
P - Purpose
L - Anticipated length of task
U - Unit executing task
S - SIR/SOR to be answered
I - Intended effect or outcome of the task

Use of this acronym will ensure leaders understand all the critical portions of each task. Additionally, this technique will allow adjacent leaders to anticipate how this effects task may impact their AOR. This acronym is only a technique; any technique will work as long as each of these critical portions of each task are addressed as a part of the rehearsal.

Just as we rehearse key targets in a lethal fight, it may also be relevant to rehearse key engagements in a stability operation and support operation. Not all negotiations are key to success, but it is imperative that those critical engagements are linked in time and space, synchronized with the plan, and result in effects that are tied to achieving the objectives. It also bears remembering that a series of lesser negotiations or meetings done poorly has a cumulative effect; locals talk to one another, and the sidewalk telegraph is a major information source in the Third World.

PLOT-CR is used to quickly ensure that lethal targets are synchronized with the plan, but it does not sufficiently address the key aspects of each key target. The acronym WATERS serves this purpose, ensuring that key engagements are rehearsed in a matter of minutes:

W – Who are we meeting with and what his issues are. This confirms that we know why this meeting is important, and demonstrates that we know critical information about the partner.

A – Action leader conducting the engagement. This ensures that SOI standards are being followed.

T – Time and place. This links the engagement to all events in time and space and helps to prevent IO fratricide.

E – Effects we want to achieve. This codifies that our objectives are nested with higher-level goals.

R – Response to a non-negotiated agreement. This ensures that second- and third-order effects are considered and planned for.

S – Specific command messages to deliver. This nests our talking points with higher.

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IMPROVED APPLICATION

NO BUSH - NO SADDAM
YES . YES FOR ISLAM